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Pricing Decentralization in Customized Pricing
Systems and Network Models
Ahmet Serdar Şimşek
In this thesis, we study the implications of multi-party pricing for both consumers and
producers in different settings. Within most organizations, the final price of a product
or service is usually the result of a chain of pricing decisions. This chain may consist
of different departments of the same company as well as different companies in a specific
industry. Understanding the implications of such chains on the final prices and on consumer
and producer surplus is the key topic of this dissertation.
In the first part of this thesis, we consider a network in which products consist of com-
binations of perishable resources. In this model, different revenue-maximizing “controllers”
determine the resource prices and the price of the product is the sum of the prices of the
constituent resources. For uncapacitated networks, we develop bounds on the “price of
anarchy” – the loss from totally decentralized control versus centralized control – as the
number of controllers increases. We present provably convergent algorithms for calculating
Nash equilibrium prices for both the uncapacitated and capacitated cases and –using these
algorithms– illustrate counterintuitive situations in which consumer surplus increases after
decentralization. While we develop our model in the context of airline pricing, it is appli-
cable to any service network such as freight transportation, pipelines, and toll roads as well
as to the more general case of supply chain networks.
In the rest of the dissertation, we focus on understanding and improving pricing decisions
in the case when corporate headquarters set a list price for all products but local sales force
is given discretion to adjust (or negotiate) prices for individual deals. This form of pricing
is called list pricing with discretion (LPD) and it is commonly found in most business-to-
business markets and in certain business-to-consumer settings, including consumer lending,
insurance, and automobile sales. In the LPD setting, the question of how much (if any)
pricing discretion should be granted to local sales force is crucial. In the second part of this
thesis, we study this issue using two data sets - one from an online lender who sets all prices
centrally and one from an indirect lender with local pricing discretion. We find strong
evidence that the indirect sales force adjusts prices in a way that improves profitability.
However, we also show that using a centralized, data-driven pricing optimization system
has the potential of improving profitability further. In addition, using a control function
approach, we show that the discretion applied by the local sales force introduces significant
endogeneity into the indirect lender’s pricing process. Ignoring this endogeneity can lead to
severe underestimation of price sensitivity. These insights are valuable for any customized
pricing market in which in-person interaction is part of the price-setting process.
Finally, in the last part, we focus on the underlying negotiation process of the LPD
setting and on the fact that not only buyers differ in their willingness-to-pay (WTP) but
sellers also differ in the minimum prices (reservation prices) that they are willing to accept
for the transaction. We develop a methodology based on the Expectation-Maximization
(EM) algorithm to estimate both the WTP and the reservation price distributions given
transactions data. The required data include information about both completed trades
and failed trades, however price information is only available for completed trades (which
is the most common situation in these markets). Using the same data from the auto
lending industry, we show that our approach provides improved estimates of customer price-
sensitivity over the approaches commonly used in practice. We also show how the WTP
and reservation price estimates can be used to improve profits for the seller by optimally
setting reservation prices on negotiations.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
Pricing is the moment of truth - all of marketing comes to focus in the pricing
decision. –Raymond Corey
The Harvard Business School professor wrote these words in 1962 and they have been
proven to be true in numerous occasions under varying circumstances since then. With
the advances in the pricing and revenue management literature, pricing is now seen as a
fundamental problem of operations as well as it is of marketing. More recently, a McKin-
sey&Company study noted that “Pricing is the most sensitive profit lever that managers
can influence” ([Baker et al., 2010]). Notwithstanding its importance, pricing often remains
a messy business in many companies with many different parts of the company involved in
setting prices. Therefore, it requires effectively managing different parts of an organization,
all of which has some level of involvement in bringing a product to the market.
Regardless of how pricing might be managed within a particular organization, the final
price of a product or service is usually the result of a chain or network of pricing decisions.
This chain may consist of different departments of the same company as well as different
companies in a specific industry. While a flight itinerary that includes flights from different
airlines might be an example of the former case, an auto loan which is originated from a
lending company through a dealer is a good example of the latter case. Understanding the
implications of such chains on the final prices and on consumer and producer surplus is the
topic of this dissertation.
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Pricing organizations can be analyzed both from industry-wide and company-wide per-
spectives. From an industry perspective, pricing mechanism of products that use resources
managed by different companies has substantial effects on the welfare of both producers and
consumers. This has been known since the introduction of double marginalization concept
by [Spengler, 1950] and the pricing inefficiencies caused by this concept have been widely
studied in supply chains networks ([Lariviere and Porteus, 2001], [Perakis and Roels, 2007],
[Kaya and Őzer, 2012] are good references).
From the companies’ points of view, as the new statistical and mathematical tools have
been developed to support pricing, designing an effective pricing mechanism has become
a vital part of their operations. The question of who should have the power to set prices
within an organization has seen some interest in the Operations Management, Marketing,
and Industrial Organization literature. Starting with [Weinberg, 1975], a number of papers
have modeled pricing discretion as a principal-agent problem. The problem for the prin-
cipal (headquarters) is to design a contract that specifies how much commission the agent
(salesperson) will be paid as a function of sales and price. The problem for the salespeople
is how much effort to expend given the contract and the sales prospects they face given that
effort is expensive (in terms of utility).
Therefore, both for the industry-wide and company-wide perspectives, the question of
how to delegate the pricing authority to different parts of the system is crucial in designing
an effective pricing mechanism. In this thesis, we study the implications of multi-party
pricing for both consumers and producers in several different settings. In Chapter 2, we
develop a theoretical model for the industry-wide problem where we consider cases in which
different revenue-maximizing “controllers” control the prices associated with different re-
sources and the price of the product is the sum of the prices of the constituent resources.
At one extreme, a single authority might set all resource prices, which is called centralized
pricing; at the other extreme there would be a different controller associated with each
resource, which is called (fully) decentralized pricing.
To model this setting we consider a network in which products are defined by combina-
tions of connecting edges and each edge corresponds to a perishable resource. One example
is an airline network in which the resources are flight legs and the products are itineraries
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serving different origin-destination pairs. Our model is similar to the classical revenue man-
agement models described in papers such as [Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994], [Gallego and
van Ryzin, 1997]. It is well-known that Nash equilibria in decentralized networks are not
generally the most efficient structure, in the sense that both the producer and consumer
surplus can be improved ([Dubey, 1986]). While the motivating problem for this model
comes from the airline industry, the final model is directly applicable to any service net-
work such as freight transportation, pipelines, and toll roads as well as to the more general
case of supply chain networks.
In Chapters 3 and 4, we study the company-wide problem. In particular, we develop an
empirical model to analyze the case when corporate headquarters create a price list while
local sales force have discretion to negotiate prices for individual deals. We call this form
of pricing list pricing with discretion (LPD) and it is commonly found in customized pric-
ing systems, such as most business-to-business markets and certain business-to-consumer
settings, including consumer lending, insurance, real estate, and retail automotive sales.
In this setting, a fundamental question is how much (if any) pricing discretion should be
granted to the local sales force.
Similar to the definitions for the industry-wide case, while the case where corporate
headquarter controls most of the pricing decisions is described as centralized pricing, the
case where the local sales force has considerable pricing discretion is called decentralized
pricing. While LPD is common in many markets, there is little consistency among markets
or even within the same market on how it is applied. This fact alone demands in-depth
analyses towards the optimal implementation of the LPD policy.
We note that there has been a general movement away from negotiated pricing in con-
sumer markets towards posted or list prices. Prior to about 1870, most retail prices in the
United States were negotiated between the customer and the seller. However, over time,
almost all retail pricing in the United States (with the notable exception of automobiles) has
migrated from negotiated pricing to list pricing or some variation thereof ([Phillips, 2012b]).
While there are many reasons for this shift, the fact that it has occurred strongly suggests
that the value of the information possessed by the local sales person is not great enough to
outweigh the benefits of centralized pricing in retail markets. Under what conditions the
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value of the local sales person’s skill and knowledge outweighs the benefits of centralized
pricing in customized pricing systems is an open question.
Furthermore, even though there is a considerable amount of literature for theoretical
analysis of various pricing mechanisms in the LPD setting, empirical studies in this area are
much rarer and the need for empirical validation of such theoretical models recently became
more apparent. We believe that this research is the first empirical study of the effects of
pricing decentralization within an organization.
The main contributions of this thesis are:
• We incorporate competition introduced to markets by decentralization to the classical
network model of [Gallego and van Ryzin, 1997] and develop bounds on the “price
of anarchy” – the loss from totally decentralized control versus centralized control –
for the uncapacitated networks as the number of controllers increases. We present
provably convergent algorithms for calculating Nash equilibrium prices for both the
uncapacitated and capacitated cases, which, to the best of our knowledge, are the first
algorithms offered to compute equilibrium prices for a general network with perishable
resources. Using these algorithms, we are able to make counterintuitive observations
for capacitated networks, such as the fact that there are situations in which consumer
surplus increases after decentralization.
• We propose a method for quantifying the value of price discretion in a specific or-
ganization and –using this method– show that while the indirect sales force adjusts
prices in a way that improves profitability, using a centralized, data-driven pricing
optimization system has the potential of improving profitability further. We also pro-
vide empirical evidence that the effects of endogeneity strongly exist in the sales data
of a pricing organization when significant pricing authority has been delegated to the
sales staff.
• We present a methodology based on the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm to
estimate both the willingness-to-pay (WTP) and the reservation price distributions
for the customers and sellers, respectively, given transactions data which lacks the
price information for lost sales – that is, negotiations that did not result in a sale.
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We also show how the WTP and reservation price estimates can be used to improve
revenues for the seller by optimally setting reservation prices on negotiations.
After stating these high-level features of this thesis, we can study each chapter further
in detail. The research in Chapter 2 resulted from collaboration with Robert Phillips and
the research in Chapters 3 and 4 resulted from collaborations with Robert Phillips and
Garrett van Ryzin. In each chapter, we studied the aforementioned problems of the pricing
decentralization and arrived at many insightful descriptive and prescriptive results.
1.1 Network Pricing and The Price of Anarchy
In Chapter 2, we consider the problem of pricing on a network. The classic example is an
airline that operates a flight network with connections. In this case, it is standard to refer
to the individual flights as resources and the itineraries that passengers can fly using one
or more combinations of flights as products. The problem of how an airline should price
and manage its products given an underlying flight network has been widely studied – see
Chapter 5 of [Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b] for a survey.
In this chapter, we consider the case in which the the prices and availability of resources
in a network may be set by different firms, which we call controllers, each of whom is
seeking to maximize expected revenue or profit. The price that is quoted to a customer
for a product is the sum of the prices quoted by the controllers. It is well known that
two controllers setting the price for a single product will set a higher price than a single
controller resulting in both lower total producer surplus and consumer surplus. This is
the classic case of double marginalization first identified by [Spengler, 1950]. Our work
extends the concept of double marginalization in two ways. First, we consider general
networks of resources with arbitrary control structures. Second, we consider the case in
which individual resources may have constrained capacity as in an airline or other service
network. Our findings are quite consistent with the classic double marginalization result –
in the absence of capacity constraints, increasing the number of controllers tends to increase
price and decrease the total amount of both consumer and producer surplus. For this case,
we also provide bounds for the loss of consumer and producer surplus as a function of the
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number of controllers. These bounds approach zero as the number of controllers approaches
infinity, which implies that the decentralized pricing case can be arbitrarily inefficient in
terms of revenue and consumer surplus loss relative to the centralized pricing case. The
classic summary of double marginalization is that “The only thing worse than a monopolist
is two monopolists.” We would extend that result to say that “The only thing worse than
two monopolists is a network of monopolists.”
The analysis of capacitated networks is more complex and we cannot make strong state-
ments about the relationship of consumer and producer surplus with the number of con-
trollers. However, we present a provably convergent algorithm for calculating Nash equi-
librium prices on capacitated networks. The proposed algorithm is based on a successive
under-relaxation method ([Phillips, 1984]) and efficiently computes the equilibrium prices
for general networks. This type of fixed point algorithm has been used to compute equilib-
rium of supply and demand in multicommodity markets ([Khilnani and Tse, 1985]). To the
best of our knowledge, this thesis presents the first algorithm offered to compute equilibrium
prices for a general network with perishable resources. Additionally, we present numerical
examples illustrating different situations and show that, contrary to the unconstrained cases,
there are situations in which consumer surplus can increase with more controllers.
We note that our results are often described in terms of airlines, however, the results are
quite general and apply to any situation in which the mechanics of supply and demand can
be described by a network. This would include service networks such as telecommunications
and transportation as well as supply chain networks.
Our work in Chapter 2 is related to several major areas of research. There has been
considerable research about quantifying the efficiency gap between centralized and decen-
tralized networks –the so-called “price of anarchy”. Much of this research is focused on
competition in networks with congestion effects ([Johari and Tsitsiklis, 2004], [Acemoglu
and Ozdaglar, 2007]). [Farahat and Perakis, 2009] and [Farahat and Perakis, 2011] analyze
the efficiency of price competition among multi-product firms in differentiated oligopolies
which offers gross substitute products to consumers. [Granot and Yin, 2008] studies the
pricing inefficiencies and stability of coalitions under push and pull assembly systems. [Yin,
2010] investigates the conditions leading to stable coalitions among perfectly complementary
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suppliers. Our work is also related to the literature regarding supply chain coordination.
Basic references for supply chain coordination include the survey papers [Cachon, 2003] and
[Chen, 2003].
One application of our work in Chapter 2 is airline networks where alliances and mergers
have led to increasing consolidation of the industry over the past 20 years. [Park, 1997],
[Park and Zhang, 2000] and [Brueckner and Whalen, 2000] use structural econometric mod-
els to measure the effects of alliances on airfares and conclude that fares decrease signifi-
cantly under alliance of flight legs with vertical competition. [Park, 1997] and [Park and
Zhang, 2000] also show (again empirically) that economic welfare increases under alliances
when the size of the markets is sufficiently large.
In addition to incorporating competition introduced to markets by decentralization to
the classical network model of [Gallego and van Ryzin, 1997], our work also generalizes
[Yin, 2010]’s work by considering the capacity constraints for the network resources. In-
troducing capacity constraints for perishable resources makes our model better suited to
pricing problems in the revenue management context. Another important contribution of
our paper is using the successive under-relaxation method to efficiently calculate the Nash
equilibrium prices in such capacitated network structures. Using this algorithm, we are able
to make counterintuitive observations for capacitated networks, such as the fact that there
are situations in which consumer surplus increases after decentralization.
1.2 Effects of Field Price Discretion on Profitability
In Chapters 3 and 4, we analyze the LPD setting in customized pricing systems in detail.
Chapter 3 addresses the effects of field price discretion on the revenue of the companies
using an empirical analysis. In many customized pricing settings, corporate headquarters
set a list price for all products but local sales staff are given (limited) discretion to adjust (or
negotiate) prices for individual deals. Thus, for example, the standard list price for a Class
8 semi-trailer truck might be $125,000 but the salesperson might have authority to provide
a discount up to 20%. In this case, the salesperson could go as low as $100,000 in order
to make the sale. The ultimate price for a deal would be somewhere between $100,000 and
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8
$125,000 depending upon the skill of the sales person, the willingness-to-pay of the buyer
and other factors1.
While list pricing with discretion is a common practice in many markets, there is little
consistency in how it is applied. For example, a 1977 survey of wholesale medical supply
and equipment companies found that 29% of the responding firms had centralized prices
(i.e. no discretion), 48% allowed sales personnel to deviate up to fixed limits, and 23%
had fully decentralized pricing (Stephenson et al., 1979). A 2010 Oliver Wyman survey
noted that local discretion was used for more than 50% of the unsecured loans and more
than 70% of the secured loans offered by major European banks. A 2011 survey found that
between 30% and 40% of unsecured loans and lines of credit originated or renewed at major
Canadian banks involved some level of local price discretion ([Phillips, 2012c]).
This wide variation of policies among markets and within the same market reflects the
fact that there is no universally accepted approach to granting pricing discretion. Within
many companies, the question of how much discretion (if any) should be granted to the
sales force is controversial and often a source of tension between Sales and other functions
such as Marketing and Finance ([Dutta et al., 2003] and [Kotler et al., 2006]). Typically,
Sales will argue for more discretion to be granted to the sales force while Marketing and
Finance will argue for greater centralization.
There are arguments both for and against decentralizing pricing authority. [Simonetto
et al., 2012] (pg. 846.) note that, “Generally speaking, decentralized (pricing) organiza-
tions offer greater speed, flexibility, and responsiveness, while centralized organizations offer
greater consistency, standardization, and control.” To understand the tension between cen-
tralized and decentralized pricing in more detail, it is useful to list the arguments on both
sides. Potential benefits for centralized pricing include:
• Data pooling - Headquarters has access to data from all corporate sales. To the extent
that customer characteristics and responses are consistent across regions, corporate-
1In many cases, there is a discretion hierarchy – a sales person has the authority to discount to a certain
level, deeper discounts may require the approval of a sales manager who, in turn has a limit on the depth of
discount that she can authorize. Deeper discounts would then require approval from the Vice President of
Sales.
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wide sales data can provide more accurate estimation of customer preferences, price-
sensitivity, and better market segmentation than any single salesperson or sales re-
gion. In addition, computerized price-optimization systems can use this information
to quantify customer price-sensitivity and estimate profit-maximizing prices. If the
system is able to do this better than the majority of the sales staff, then centralized
pricing will be most effective.
• Control - Centralized pricing enables headquarters to change prices quickly in response
to changing economic environments, cost changes, or corporate goals. It also enables
the company to pursue different goals in different markets or for different product
lines. For example, a company might decide to set prices to maximize profit in some
geographies or product lines but be willing to accept reduced profits in other areas in
order to increase market share. If the sales force is setting prices, it can be difficult
to pursue such mixed goals.
As an example, corporate attempts to increase sales prices by raising list prices are
often thwarted by sales force discounting. A sales representative from a Midwest-
ern manufacturing company described how he would shield customers from list price
increases:
I looked at this prices sheet in [1994] and on the new one in [1995] there was
a 3.2% difference. We would walk in and sell them at [30% off list price] and
I would change the [discount by 3.2%] so it was a very simple price change.
(Quoted in [Dutta et al., 2003]).
This pattern is not uncommon and, in a number of industries it has led to a wide
divergence of pocket price (what the customer actually pays) from the list price. Many
examples of such divergence are noted in Appendix 1 of [Marn et al., 2010].
• Consistency – There are a number of reasons why a company might wish to enforce
conformance to list prices. For one thing it may wish to advertise its prices. For
another, the company may wish to avoid being seen as “unfair” for selling the same
product to different customers at different prices. Finally, in some cases, management
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may be concerned that price discretion could lead to discrimination – real or perceived
– against protected groups such as women or minorities. This concern is very real
in the auto lending industry where there have been a number of class-action lawsuits
against lenders claiming such discrimination ([Cohen, 2007]).
• Sales Force Variation – In a large sales force there is usually a wide variation of skills.
There are senior salespeople who are skilled at selling a product on its value and
thereby capturing higher prices. On the other hand, less skilled or less experienced
sales staff may “sell on price” - that is, they drop quickly to the lowest possible price
point in order to make the sale. Limited discretion is often justified internally as
enabling the firm to gain some benefit from the skills of their more skilled sales staff
while limiting the under-pricing damage from less experienced sales staff.
On the other side of the coin, there are three common arguments for some level of pricing
decentralization.
• Custom – In many industries, price negotiation is customary. In this case, customers
may abandon a seller who tries to unilaterally impose “take-it-or-leave-it” pricing.
A field sales representative at a Canadian bank stated in an interview that, “Our
long-time customers expect that we can help them out a bit with the rate. If we
hold the line too firmly, they will think we are holding out on them and might go
elsewhere.” [Gelber, 2008] (pp. 66-67) discusses the role of custom in the persistence
of negotiation over new car prices and the failure of companies such as Carmax to
eliminate negotiations from the buying process.
• Perception of a Bargain – It has been observed across many industry as well as in
experimental settings that presenting a price as a discount from a higher list price will
often result in higher sales than presenting the same price as the undiscounted list
price (see [Őzer and Zheng, 2012] for a survey). Allowing local sales staff to present
a price as a discount from a posted list price may result in higher sales than posting
the lower price and treating it as firm.
• Local Information – Local sales staff has information on individual deals that is not
available to headquarters and is not incorporated in the list price. This information
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may include customer-specific information such as the customer’s expressed eagerness
to purchase or insistence on a low price as well as local competitive information. Much
of the existing literature has concentrated exclusively on this aspect of decentralized
pricing.
The increasing use of pricing optimization systems in many companies may be leading
to a move toward more centralized pricing. The idea is that, by using richer sources of
data and explicit analysis, such systems can outperform local sales staff in estimating the
price-sensitivity of individual customers. This point of view is argued by Simonetto et al.
(2012). There is an interesting parallel with credit scoring. Prior to the 1960’s, evaluation
of the creditworthiness of prospective borrowers was performed entirely at the local level.
Scoring methodologies that analyzed data about each customer’s credit history and current
financial situation turned out to be more efficient and effective predictors of default than
individual judgment. As a result, evaluation of the credit-risk of prospective borrowers is
now almost entirely centralized at major financial institutions ([Poon, 2007]).
Chapter 3 particularly examines the use of pricing discretion in the auto lending industry.
We compare pricing by two lenders. The first offered loans exclusively on-line with no local
discretion. The second was an indirect lender who offered loans exclusively through dealers.
In this case, the lender generated a price list that specified rates for various types of deals,
however, the dealers had the authority to change the rate within limits for individual sales.
Importantly, individual dealers were motivated to charge the highest rate they could while
still closing the deal since the dealership profits from loans at higher rates. We find in this
case that, on the whole, dealers charge rates that are closer to the customer “willingness-
to-pay” than the price-list rates, leading to higher profits for the dealer. We show this by
comparing the current profits of the lenders with the profits that would have been observed
in the counterfactual scenario where the dealers use nonnegotiable fixed rates. However, we
also show that using a centralized, data-driven pricing optimization system has the potential
to improve profitability further. A combination of data-driven price optimization and field
price discretion has the potential of achieving the highest levels of profit, however, in this
case, the added benefits of price discretion are much smaller.
Furthermore, using a control function approach, we find evidence that the discretion
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applied by local sales staff introduces significant endogeneity into historical sales data.
Since this effect is present for the indirect lender but not for the on-line lender, we argue
that it results from the indirect pricing and sales process and is not an industry-wide effect.
Estimation approaches that do not adjust for this endogeneity are shown to significantly
under-estimate customer price elasticities.
Starting with [Weinberg, 1975], many papers studied the features of pricing discretion
concept. [Weinberg, 1975] shows that if salesmen are paid a commission based on gross
margin, decentralized pricing will maximize both their own and company’s profits. [Lal,
1986] shows that in this model, optimal profits are the same under centralization and
delegation if information is symmetric. However, if the agent has private information about
deals, pricing delegation can generate higher profits for the firm. [Mishra and Prasad,
2004] show that, even when the agent possesses private information, a company can set
prices centrally and capture the full benefits available from decentralized pricing by using
an appropriate contract structure. They then analyze competitive markets and show that,
under asymmetric information, an equilibrium always exists where all firms use centralized
pricing, regardless of the intensity of competition ([Mishra and Prasad, 2005]).
[Joseph, 2001] considers a model in which sales staff decide, for each deal, how much
effort to expend and what price to charge. In his model, centralization of pricing author-
ity is sometimes preferable to full decentralization. [Bhardwaj, 2001] reaches a similarly
mixed conclusion in the case of competing firms when principals and agents have the same
information. [Roth et al., 2006] consider the case of bargaining versus posted price for cus-
tomized products and show that, if bargaining costs are low, bargaining can be a preferred
approach for the seller.
These papers have primarily been theoretical. Empirical studies of the effectiveness of
pricing discretion are rarer. [Stephenson et al., 1979] compare the performance (profitabil-
ity) of 108 medical equipment suppliers. They found that, for this sample, firms granting
the highest level of pricing discretion generated the lowest sales and profit performance.
[Frenzen et al., 2010] compare a sample of 181 companies from the industrial machinery
and electrical engineering industry in Germany and report that a positive effect of price
delegation on firm performance, which is amplified under high market uncertainty and in-
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formation asymmetry. [Homburg et al., 2012] use a survey of 124 companies from various
B2B industries in Germany and find a nonlinear, inverted U-shaped relationship between
the vertical delegation of pricing authority and profitability.
These studies would suggest that there are factors at play other than simply superior
information on the part of the sales person. This chapter of the dissertation proposes a
method for quantifying the value of price discretion in a specific organization. We also
provide empirical evidence that the effects of endogeneity strongly exist in the sales data
of a pricing organization when significant pricing authority has been delegated to the sales
staff.
1.3 Estimating Willingness-to-Pay and Reserve Price Distri-
butions from Negotiation Data
In Chapter 4, we focus more on the underlying negotiation process of the LPD setting
and also consider an environment where less data is collected –prices are not available
for lost sales. In the customized pricing markets where the same item is routinely sold to
different customers at different prices, the final price of a transaction is typically determined
through negotiation between the potential customer and a salesperson. A familiar example
is negotiating the price for a new car. In such markets, it is likely that the outcome of any
particular negotiation – whether or not a sale takes place and, if so, at what price – will
depend upon the willingness-to-pay (WTP) of the customer, the reservation price of the
sales person and their respective skills at negotiation. If the WTP of the customer is less
than the seller’s reservation price, then no transaction will take place. On the other hand,
if the customer’s WTP is greater than the seller’s reservation, then it is possible (although
not inevitable) that a transaction will take place. If a transaction takes place, it will be
at some price between the seller reservation price and the customer’s WTP. Typically, the
seller will have a data base containing information about historic transactions. This data
will generally include information about the product and customer for each negotiation
as well as the price of the transaction if a sale took place. The problem we consider is
how a seller can estimate the WTP distribution of its customers from such a data set.
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In Operations Management, Industrial Organization and Marketing literature, extensive
research has focused on the various methods of estimation of WTP for different types of
products –for a good review see [Breidert et al., 2006].
A common approach to estimating customer price-response in these markets, which
we also utilized in Chapter 3, is to assume that the prices offered to different customers
are random variables that are independent of each other and independent of customer
willingness-to-pay. Furthermore, it is often assumed that prices are available for both
completed sales and for lost sales. In this case, estimating the price-response function from
historical data is straightforward, which we include here for completeness: Assume that a
seller is offering a single product and has a historical data base of outcomes that includes
a price and outcome (sale or no sale) for each negotiation. Assume further that the price
for transaction i is independent of other prices and of the customer willingness to pay, that
is pi = p + εi where pi is the price for transaction i and εi is a 0-mean random variable.
The seller would like to estimate the vector of parameters θ where F̄ (p : θ) is the ccdf
of the willingness-to-pay distribution of the customers. This ccdf is equal to the fraction
of customers who would purchase at a price of p. Given a functional form for F , θ can
be estimated using standard Bernoulli estimation techniques such as maximum-likelihood
estimation (see [Phillips, 2005] or [Agrawal and Ferguson, 2007] for more detail).
Our approach in this chapter extends this procedure to incorporate three additional
effects.
Missing Data. It is quite common that prices are not available for lost sales. This can
occur as a result of the data capture process – a sales system might only require a
price for a closed deal – or, in the case of an active negotiation there may be no
identifiable “final price” at which negotiation broke down. The prices for lost sales
can be imputed from the prices of successful transactions but imputation potentially
introduces bias into the estimation process – see Section 4.2.2.1 for more discussion.
Reservation Price Variation. The standard estimation procedure assumes that the vari-
ation in response in the historic data is due entirely to differences in customer willingness-
to-pay. Our approach acknowledges that the variation may also be due in part to
differences in seller reservation prices. In a large sales organization with decentral-
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ized pricing authority, it is quite reasonable to assume that different sales staff may
have different reservation prices for the same product. A sales person who is close
to meeting her quota might well be willing to accept a lower price than one who has
already met her quota. Sales staff may also vary in their willingness to “hold the line”
on a higher price due to different levels of ability or different tradeoffs between effort
and compensation. In the case of the auto lending example that we consider in this
chapter, the auto loan is only part of the larger transaction of purchasing a car. A
sales person might be willing to negotiate a lower rate on a loan if it would result in
a highly profitable car sale than if the corresponding car sale is less profitable.
Endogeneity. In the case of a negotiated price, it is almost certain that the final price
of a deal will depend in part on unobserved characteristics of both the seller and the
buyer. An experienced sales person may be able to determine that one buyer has a
high willingness-to-pay while another has a lower willingness-to-pay and will adjust
their negotiating approach accordingly. For example, a high WTP buyer may express
eagerness to close the deal and seem uninterested in the price while a low WTP buyer
may be very eager to bargain and may focus intently on the price. To the extent that
the final price is correlated with signals of the buyers’ WTPs that are not recorded in
the data, endogeneity will be introduced into the historic data. The same is true on
the seller’s side: if buyers receive signals during the negotiation that are correlated
with the seller’s reservation price, they can potentially negotiate a better price for
themselves.
Our estimation method is based on applying the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algo-
rithm to historical data in order to estimate the parameters of the underlying willingness-
to-pay and reservation price distributions. The EM algorithm is a common approach to
estimating underlying distributions in the case of censored data. In our case, the data cen-
soring occurs because the buyers’ WTP and sellers’ reserve price values are unobservable
and also we have no price information for a negotiation when a trade does not take place.
When a trade does not take place, we assume that R > W where R is the reservation price
of the seller and W is the willingness-to-pay of the buyer. On the other hand, when a trade
does take place, we assume that the price is equal to the Nash bargaining solution, that
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is, p = (R+W )/2. The EM algorithm iteratively estimates the parameters that maximize
the likelihood of the data given the underlying distributions. We applied this method to
a large test data set of auto-loan data, which we also used in Chapter 3. This data set
includes prices for lost sales which enables us to evaluate the effectiveness of the method in
estimating these prices relative to other approaches. On the test data set, our approach sig-
nificantly outperforms a benchmark method in predicting the final price for lost customers.
It also slightly outperforms the benchmark in predicting take-up. Finally, it provides an
estimate of the seller reservation price distribution which is interesting in itself.
Lastly, we show how our estimates of WTP and reservation price can be used to increase
the revenue of the seller. We conduct a counter-factual analysis of the revenue generated
when the seller is constrained by reserve prices that have been optimized using the estimated
WTP and reservation price distributions. Our results suggest that the auto lender could
increase its profits by up to 7.1% by imposing optimized reserve prices estimated using our
approach on its dealers.
1.4 Conclusions and Future Research Directions
In this thesis, we study the implications of multi-party pricing for both consumers and
suppliers in several different settings. In the first part of the thesis, we consider pricing on a
network of resources and investigate the effects of different control schemes on prices in such
a network in which independent controllers set the prices for the individual resources and
customers pay the total price for all of the resources that they consume. We develop a model
that extends the concept of double marginalization (or horizontal externalities) to general
networks. We analyze the problem from both the network controllers’ and consumers’ points
of view by studying both parties’ welfare under different control schemes. In particular, we
derive bounds on the price of anarchy for both consumer and producer surplus as the number
of controllers increases in the unconstrained setting. We also present provably convergent
algorithms using a successive under-relaxation method for calculating the Nash equilibrium
prices for the capacitated networks, which helps in understanding the behavior of total
network revenue and consumer surplus variation after a change in the network’s control
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structure.
Incorporation of dynamic models with stochastic demands to our model in Chapter 2 is
a natural extension of this study. Another promising future research direction is modeling
the competition for the same product. There has recently been a trend in incorporating
competition among products via so-called consumer choice models into network revenue
management. Hence, implications of adding horizontal product competition to the model
on our results might be interesting. Deriving analytical bounds on the revenue and consumer
surplus change after decentralization for the capacitated networks is a complicated problem.
These bounds will clearly depend on the capacity levels of each resource, however the relation
between the capacity levels and the change in consumer and producer surplus is certainly
nontrivial. We show in Chapter 2 that there are situations where the consumer surplus will
increase after decentralization. This thesis, hence, provides a step forward towards finding
the conditions under which consumer surplus increases after decentralization and deriving
analytical results on the revenue and consumer surplus bounds as a function of the capacity
levels.
In the third and fourth chapters, we study the question of how much (if any) pricing
discretion should be granted to local sales staff in the LPD setting. First, we investigated
this issue using two data sets from auto lending industry – one from an online lender where
all prices are set centrally and one from an indirect lender with local pricing discretion.
The study in Chapter 3 significantly contributes to the pricing delegation literature by
proposing a method for quantifying the value of pricing discretion in a specific organization.
Using a control function approach, we find evidence that the discretion applied by local
sales staff introduces substantial endogeneity into the sales process. Failing to adjust for
this endogeneity will significantly underestimate customer price elasticities. Additionally,
comparing the current profits of the lenders with the profits using the estimated centralized
rates; we find that dealers charge rates that are closer to the customer willingness-to-pay,
leading to higher profits for the dealer (up to 12% for the indirect lender). However, we also
show that using a centralized, data-driven pricing optimization system has the potential
of improving profitability further. These results are valuable for any customized pricing
market in which in-person interaction is part of the price-setting process.
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In Chapter 4, we develop a structural estimation method based on the Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm to estimate willingness-to-pay (WTP) and reserve price dis-
tributions from price negotiations data. The data required consists only of whether or not
trade takes place and, if it does, the realized price. The method provides accurate estimates
when applied to both synthetic and real data sets. We also show how the WTP and reserve
price estimates can be used to improve profits for the seller by optimally setting reserve
prices on negotiations. A counter-factual analysis based on a real-world dataset of auto
loans show that an increase in seller profits up to 7.1% can be achieved by giving the sales
force appropriate reserve prices based on our WTP and reserve price estimates.
The studies in Chapters 3 and 4 can be viewed as parts of a comprehensive analysis of
the list pricing with discretion policies. The insights in these chapters will together help to
understand the decentralized customized pricing systems more deeply. In both studies, we
analyze the same data (the indirect lender data –along with the on-line lender data used
only in Chapter 3) using two different approaches. The analyses in these chapters lead to
the conclusion that even though field sales force was adjusting the prices in a way that
improves profits, the company could still do better by utilizing more structured statistical
analysis in both determining the optimal list prices and in imposing optimized price ranges
for each specific product on the field sales force.
Direct comparison of the performances of these two approaches would not be completely
fair, since they are developed for different environments. In particular, the method in
Chapter 3 –the probit model together with the control function approach– can be used
when there is reliable price information for lost sales, while the one in Chapter 4 –the EM
method– does not require any price information for lost sales. Therefore, it is not surprising
that the prediction performance of the probit model, which uses more information than
the EM method, dominates the EM method in cases where lost sales price information is
available. One of the main advantages of the EM method is its ability to estimate the seller’s
reserve price distribution. Hence, if there is no price information for the lost sales and the
seller reserve prices are not generally the same for the same product (due to reasons such as
different levels of skills or different incentive mechanisms), the EM method better suits to
the analysis. On the other hand, if the price information for the lost sales is available and
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primary objective of the study is the prediction of customer willingness-to-pay, using the
probit model might be more advantageous. Besides these differences, we also note that both
approaches are variations of the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) methods and they
are both successful in dealing with the price endogeneity problem which is shown to exist
in the indirect lender data set –though the probit model with control function approaches
requires efficient instrumental variables while the EM method does not, i.e., it handles the
problem by endogenizing the price setting process in the model.
There are still important questions to be answered about LPD and several interesting
practical implications of this empirical part of the thesis. It would be interesting to study
data sets from different applications and measure the performance of both of the devel-
oped methods. Potential application areas include, but not limited to, hotel management
(group reservations), banking, real estate, and insurance. The methodology developed in
this part of the dissertation can be used to measure the relative effectiveness of different
incentive structures (e.g. sales volume vs. profitability). Measuring the effects of the deal-
ers’ inventory levels on their financing operations is also a promising research direction.
These extensions of this thesis are on the frontier of empirical revenue management and, in
addition to their intrinsic research interest, have important practical applications.
CHAPTER 2. NETWORK PRICING AND THE PRICE OF ANARCHY 20
Chapter 2
Network Pricing and The Price of
Anarchy
In this chapter, we investigate the effects of price decentralization on networks in which
independent controllers set the prices for the individual resources and customers pay the
total price for all of the resources that they consume. This can be illustrated by the
passenger airline example in Figure 2.1. In this example, there are two flights, one from
New York to Chicago and one from Chicago to Los Angeles. We assume that the two flights
connect so that three separate products can be sold: a New York to Chicago product, a
Chicago to Los Angles product, and a New York to Los Angeles product connecting in
Chicago. In the decentralized case, there are two separate controllers, one for each flight.
Each controller can set the price for his direct product and a (possibly different) price for the
connecting New York to Los Angeles product. The market price for the connecting product
is the sum of the prices set by the two controllers. In airline terms, the New York to Los
Angeles product is an interline connection and, assuming that the two airlines involved are
not partners, the price charged to the consumer would be the sum of the prices set by the
individual carriers. In contrast, a centralized controller would set the prices for all three
products in order to maximize total revenue.1
1The calculation of airline interline fares is actually considerably more complex, however the basic concept
is the same see [Barnes, 2012] for more details.
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Figure 2.1: A simple network example from passenger airline industry
It is well-known that in the case of two resources and a single product, such as Itinerary
3 in Figure 2.1, two separate controllers will lead to a higher price, lower revenue, and lower
social welfare than a single controller –classical double marginalization result. In this chap-
ter, we extend this result to general networks. We show that decentralized pricing always
leads to lower total revenue relative to centralized pricing. For the uncapacitated networks,
we develop bounds on the “price of anarchy” – the loss from totally decentralized control
versus centralized control – as the number of controllers increases. We present provably
convergent algorithms for calculating Nash equilibrium prices for both the uncapacitated
and capacitated cases. We also present numerical analyses to illustrate the effect of decen-
tralization on producer and consumer surplus. While we develop our model in the context of
airline pricing, it is directly applicable to any service network such as freight transportation,
pipelines, and toll roads as well as to the more general case of supply chain networks.
2.1 Model Description
The key elements of our model are:
1. Products require one or more resources.
2. Resources can be combined according to a network structure to produce different
products.
3. Controllers control one or more resources and set prices for the resources that they
control.
4. Resources may be constrained or unconstrained. If a resource is constrained, the total
production of products using that resource cannot exceed its capacity.
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5. All resources are perishable and have no residual value if they are not consumed.
6. Controllers seek to maximize revenue.
7. The price of each product is the sum of its resource prices.
8. The controllers can set different prices for the same resource based on the product
using that resource.
9. Prices are set once and do not change.
10. Demand for a product is a deterministic function of its price alone. There is no
competition among products in the network.
Elements 1 through 6 are standard in the network revenue management literature ([Talluri
and van Ryzin, 2004a], [Phillips, 2005]). The assumption of revenue maximization can
be replaced by profit-maximization with fixed unit costs without changing the nature of
our results: more complex unit cost structures would require additional analysis. Number
7 is non-restrictive: if there is an additional party – say a distributor – that requires
additional compensation to distribute a network product, this can be represented by adding
an additional edge to the network with the distributor as the controller of that edge. Number
8 assumes that each controller can distinguish among products using her resources and
charge different prices based on product. The assumptions of static prices and deterministic
demand go together and are clearly simplifications. The assumption that products in a
network do not compete with each other is also a simplification. We note that it is consistent
with the many of the models originally used in revenue management, however, there has
recently been considerable research into incorporating competition among products via so-
called consumer choice models into network revenue management – the reader is referred
to [Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b], [Gallego et al., 2004] and [Liu and van Ryzin, 2008] for
details.
Notation:
We reserve the letters i, j and k to index resources, products, and controllers, respec-
tively. Other notation is described as follows.
• M = number of resources (edges). Resources will also be called “legs”.
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• Ci > 0 = capacity of resource i.
• N = number of products in the market. Each product is a combination of one or
more resources.
• aij = resource to product incidence factor. In particular, aij = 1 if resource i is used
in product j and aij = 0 otherwise.
• Sj = set of resources used by product j.
• K = number of controllers in the market. We must have 1 ≤ K ≤M .
• bik = resource to controller incidence factor. In particular, bik = 1 if resource i is
controlled by controller k and bik = 0 otherwise.
• Tk = set of resources controlled by controller k.
• ejk = product to controller mapping. In particular, ejk = 1 if aijbik = 1 for some
i = 1, 2, . . . ,M and ejk = 0 otherwise. That is, ejk = 1 if controller k controls at least
one resource used in product j.
• Kj = number of controllers whose resources are used by product j. Kj =
∑
k ejk
• Uk = set of products that use at least one resource controlled by controller k.
• yk = number of products that use at least one resource controlled by controller k, i.e.,
|Uk| = yk
• pjk = price that controller k charges for resources used in product j. We note that







k ejkpjk is the price of product j.
• λj(p) = DjF̄j(p) is the demand for product j as a function of price p. We assume that
demand for each product is a continuous, downward sloping function of price. Hence
demand for each product j can be represented as the product of a constant Dj > 0
and a function F̄j(p) that is the c.c.d.f. of some probability distribution with density
fj .
CHAPTER 2. NETWORK PRICING AND THE PRICE OF ANARCHY 24
• rj = pjλj(pj) is the revenue from product j.
We assume that, for all products j, the demand functions are “regular” as defined in
[Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994]. In particular, rj(λj) is continuous, bounded, and concave;
and has a finite maximizer λ∗j . Additionally, for each product j, there exists a null price
p∞j > 0 (possibly ∞) such that limp→p∞j λ(p) = limp→p∞j pλ(p) = 0. We also assume that
all of the demand functions display the Increasing Failure Rate (IFR) property ([Lariviere,
2006]), that is hj(p) = fj(p)/F̄j(p) is an increasing function for all j and all 0 ≤ p ≤ p∞j .
We define T = {T1, T2, . . . , TK} as a network control structure. We call the case of
a single controller (K = 1) centralized pricing. The case where there is more than one
controller, i.e., K ≥ 2, is called decentralized pricing, and K = M is the fully decentralized
pricing case. We are concerned with the set of prices associated with different network
control structures.
In decentralized networks, each controller maximizes her own revenue. Controller k’s




















and we maintain the convention that the sum over an empty set equals 0.









aijDjF̄j(pj) ≤ Ci for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M
pj ≥ 0
This is the standard problem of pricing on a constrained network (see [Talluri and van
Ryzin, 2004b]).
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2.2 The Unconstrained Case
We first consider the case in which resources are unlimited – that is Ci = ∞ for i =
1, 2, . . . ,M . In this case, the network pricing problem (2.1) is separable, hence we can
optimize the revenue of each product independently. Also, it is well-known that if hj(p) is
increasing for 0 ≤ p ≤ p∞j (IFR), then rj(p) is quasi-concave on 0 ≤ p ≤ p∞j , and a unique
maximizer p∗j is guaranteed to exist ([Ziya et al., 2004]).
For centralized networks, let pcj be the maximizer of product j’s revenue function (‘c’
stands for “centralized”). Then pcj must satisfy the first order condition:
F̄j(p
c










For decentralized networks, let pejk and p
e
j denote the equilibrium price that controller k
charges for resources used in product j and total equilibrium price of product j, respectively
(‘e’ stands for “equilibrium”). The equilibrium prices of products are characterized by the
following proposition.
Proposition 1: When capacity is unconstrained, i.e. Ci = ∞ for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M , the





Furthermore, this Nash equilibrium is unique among those that satisfy the condition pj <
p∞j .
Proof For the case of a single controller, the result is immediate and corresponds to the well-
known revenue-maximizing monopoly price. In the case of multiple controllers (j : Kj ≥ 2)
the best response of player k is:
F̄j(pjk + p
−
jk)− pjkfj(pjk + p
−
jk) = 0
⇒ pjk = 1/hj(pjk + p−jk) (2.5)
Since the right hand sides of (2.5) are equal for all controllers k, the equilibrium is symmetric.
By virtue of the IFR property, this equilibrium is unique.
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In this symmetric equilibrium, we have pej = Kjp
e




⇒ pej = Kj/hj(pej) (2.7)
Q.E.D.
We note, that in the case of a finite null price, p∞j for a product, there exist Nash
Equilibria at which pjk > p
∞
j for some k. However since no revenue is generated for any
controller at these equilibria, they are of no practical interest and we will henceforth ignore
them.
2.2.1 The Price of Anarchy
We consider two components of the price of anarchy – producer surplus and consumer
surplus. We note that under our assumption of zero unit costs, producer surplus is equal
to revenue.
2.2.1.1 The Effect of Decentralization on Revenue
We utilize equation (2.6) to derive our primary result on the price of anarchy in an un-
constrained network. To do so, we make the number of controllers involved in a product
explicit by letting pKj be the equilibrium price of product j in a decentralized network where
K controllers manage the resources used by product j.
Proposition 2: When capacity is unconstrained for all resources:
• The price of a product in a decentralized network is strictly increasing in the number
of controllers involved in the product. Additionally, pKj ≤ KL p
L
j , ∀K ≥ L.
• pejk is strictly decreasing in the number of controllers involved in the product
• The total revenue of a product and the revenue of each controller is strictly decreasing
in the number of controllers involved in the product
• As the number of controllers increases, the equilibrium product price approaches the
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Table 2.1: Effects of decentralization on revenues for exponential and linear demands
Proof The first part of the Proposition is immediate from equation (2.7) and the fact that,
among the demand functions with IFR property, the maximum price increase occurs for the
one with constant hazard rate (exponential demand function), and KL is the increase rate
in this case. The second part is immediate from equation (2.6) noting that hj(Kjp
e
jk) is an
increasing function ofK. The third part follows since, as a consequence of the IFR condition,
the revenue function is quasi-concave and rj(p
K




j ) is strictly decreasing in K
considering the fact that rj is maximized when K = 1.
Finally, the last part follows since for any K ≥ 1, pKj is the unique solution of Φj(pKj ) =
K where Φj(p) = phj(p). We show that limpj→p∞j Φj(pj) = ∞. This is clearly true if
p∞j = ∞. If p∞j is finite, then, F̄j(p∞j ) = 0 implying that limpj→p∞j hj(pj) = ∞ and hence
limpj→p∞j Φj(pj) = ∞. Since Φj(p) is strictly increasing, we can write p
K = Φ−1(K) and
from the limit results, limK→∞Φ
−1
j (K) = p
∞




j ) = 0 follows
from the assumption that the demand function is regular. Q.E.D.
In the infinite-capacity case, the optimization problem is separable and the equilibrium
prices of products are independent. Therefore, we can express the prices of individual prod-
ucts as a function of the number of controllers for some commonly used demand functions.





j ) as the corresponding total product revenue. Table 2.2.1.1 shows the
equilibrium price and demand values along with the ratios of the fully decentralized to fully
centralized revenues for the products with K controllers, for exponential and linear demand
functions in an infinite capacity network.
Remark 1: The revenue ratio goes to zero as K goes to infinity by the last part of Propo-
sition 2. Hence the decentralized equilibrium solution can be arbitrarily inefficient in terms
of revenue loss relative to the centralized case.
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Remark 2: Figure 2.2 shows that the revenue loss bound goes to zero much faster for the
case of exponential demand than linear demand.














































Figure 2.2: Revenue loss ratios by the number of controllers
Remark 3: Even though Proposition 2 suggests that centralization of an unconstrained
network is beneficial to controllers, such coalitions may not be stable. Proposition 6 of
[Yin, 2010] shows that coalitions with more than two perfectly complementary suppliers
are not stable2 when resource capacities are infinite for both exponential and linear-power
(λ(p) = (a − bp)γ for a, b, γ > 0) demand functions (for linear-power demand functions,
coalitions with two suppliers may not be stable either depending on the value of γ). If
we consider coalitions for only one product, our model leads to the same result. However,
coalitions with more than two controllers can be stable in our model with both exponential
and linear demand functions, due to the fact that our model takes the network structure
of the resources into account. To see this, assume that each controller controls a single
resource. In this case, for stability of a coalition with more than two controllers, coalition
members need to jointly control both products with two resources and products with more
2A stable coalition is defined as a coalition structure in which no controller has a strictly profitable and
feasible deviation ([Yin, 2010]).
CHAPTER 2. NETWORK PRICING AND THE PRICE OF ANARCHY 29







Exponential eaj−bjpj 1bj e
aj−K e1−K





Table 2.2: Effects of decentralization on consumer surplus for exponential and linear de-
mands
than two resources (instead of controlling only one product using more than two resources).
For example, in a network with three serially connected resources, a stable coalition can
be formed among all three resource controllers, if the products with two resources have
sufficiently large demand relative to the product with three resources.
2.2.1.2 The Effect of Decentralization on Consumer Surplus
Decentralization of the networks affects consumers as well as producers. We quantify this
effect by calculating the ratio of consumer surplus under decentralized control to that under
centralized control. Let CSKj be the total consumer surplus generated for product j with




decreasing in pj . Table 2.2.1.2 shows the equilibrium consumer surplus values along with
the ratios of the fully decentralized to fully centralized consumer surpluses for the products
with K controllers, for exponential and linear demand functions in an infinite capacity
network.
Note that these ratios are smaller than their counterparts for producer surplus (see
Figure 2.3). We conjecture that, as the number of controllers increases, “the chain of
monopolies” reduces total consumer surplus more rapidly than total producer surplus.
2.3 The Constrained Case
Capacitated networks do not lend themselves to the straightforward analysis that we applied
to unconstrained networks. The solution of the centralized problem (2.2) can be charac-
terized by its KKT conditions. This problem can also be formulated with the demand
rate being the decision variable. By virtue of the assumption that demand functions are
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Figure 2.3: Consumer surplus loss ratios by the number of controllers
regular, this alternative formulation becomes a strictly convex optimization problem with a
unique solution (see [Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b]). Also, since there is a one-to-one rela-
tion between the demand and pricing functions, we can conclude that the following KKT











aijDjF̄j(pj)− Ci) = 0 i = 1...M (2.9)
µi ≥ 0 i = 1...M (2.10)
where µi ≥ 0, i = 1...M are the Lagrange multipliers with the interpretation as the marginal
opportunity costs for resources i = 1...M , respectively. Condition (2.10) assures that these
marginal opportunity costs are nonnegative. Condition (2.8) is the usual Lagrangian opti-
mality condition.
We can use these KKT conditions to derive a set of simultaneous equations for the Nash
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jk)− Ci) = 0 i = 1...M (2.12)
µi ≥ 0 i = 1...M (2.13)
So, the NE of the capacitated decentralized problem (2.1) can be derived as a fixed point
solution of (2.11), given that we calculate the optimal dual prices using the complementary
slackness conditions given in equation (2.12).
2.3.1 The Price of Anarchy
For capacitated networks, finding analytical bounds for the price of anarchy is more compli-
cated than in the uncapacitated case and closed form solutions are generally not computable.
However, we can still obtain some useful insights. Recall that the optimality and equilibrium




















i j = 1...N (2.15)
respectively, where the superscripts of µi’s are used to distinguish the centralized and de-
centralized Lagrange multipliers, and we calculate µci and µ
eq
i , i = 1...M using the cor-
responding complementary slackness conditions. Note that (2.15) is derived by summing
(2.11) over all k.
We know by Proposition 2 that the centralized optimal prices will always be smaller
than the decentralized prices for infinite capacity networks. Therefore, product demands
are always larger in decentralized systems and if a resource’s capacity constraint is binding
in a decentralized system, it will be binding for the centralized system as well. However,
the reverse case may not be true, i.e., there might be network structures whose centralized
problem is capacity constrained but decentralized problem is not. For such cases, we can
derive equilibrium prices using equation (2.4). We also know that, in the capacitated case,
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centrally optimal prices will be larger than their uncapacitated counterparts in order to sat-
isfy the capacity constraints. Hence, constrained-centralized to unconstrained-decentralized
revenue and consumer surplus ratios are always larger than the networks with unlimited
capacities. Moreover, revenue ratios shown in Table 2.2.1.1 and consumer surplus ratios
shown in Table 2.2.1.2 are lower bounds for this case as well.
We first study a simple network with two resources and three products (as in Figure
2.1).
Proposition 3: In the network structure of Figure 2.1), if all the capacity constraints are
binding when pricing is fully decentralized (K=3), then
pcj > p
eq
j j = 1, 2 (single-resource products)
pcj < p
eq
j j = 3 (multiple-resource product)
Proof If the capacity constraints are binding in the decentralized system, then they are







1 ) + λ3(p
eq







2 ) + λ3(p
eq
3 ) = C2
Clearly, if the price of one of the products using a single resource (i = 1, 2) increases after
decentralization, the price of the other single-resource product will also increase, and vice
versa. Now, assume to the contrary that
pcj < p
eq
j j = 1, 2 (single-resource products) (2.16)
pcj > p
eq
















by (2.14) and (2.15) (2.17)
⇒ µc1 < µ
eq
1 (2.18)








3 ) by the IFR property
⇒ 1















by (2.14) and (2.15)
(2.19)







⇒ µc2 > µ
eq
2 by (2.18) (2.21)
⇒ pc2 > p
eq
2
which contradicts (2.16). Q.E.D.
Consider an arbitrary network structure where only a single resource’s capacity con-
straint is binding in the decentralized problem (hence in the centralized problem as well).
In such a case, it is easy to conclude that the price of the product that uses only that specific
resource (say product k) will decrease after fully decentralization of the network. Assume










If we assume to the contrary that pck ≤ p
eq















∀p and ∀j s.t. aij = 1 , j 6= k
⇒ peqj > p
c
j by the IFR property
which contradicts (2.22).
Even for these simple cases, we cannot derive conclusions about how much total revenue
or total consumer surplus changes as pricing is decentralized. We know that the total
revenue always (weakly) decreases after decentralization by the structure of the controllers’
optimization problem. However, there are cases where total consumer surplus increases
with more controllers when the decentralized problem is capacity constrained. In fact, we
derived numerical examples in which the price of a product with single/multiple controller(s)
inreases/decreases after decentralization of the network. We present these results in Section
2.5.
CHAPTER 2. NETWORK PRICING AND THE PRICE OF ANARCHY 34
2.4 Computing Equilibrium Prices
We next present provably convergent algorithms to calculate the Nash equilibrium prices,
first for the unconstrained and then for more general (constrained) networks.
2.4.1 Computing Equilibrium Prices in an Unconstrained Network
As noted in Section 2.2.1.1, the unconstrained problem is entirely separable. It is thus
possible to calculate the optimal price for each product separately by finding the unique
value of pj such that pj = Kj/h(pj) for each product. The prices charged by each controller
can then be calculated as pjk = pj/Kj . Since the revenue function is continuous and quasi-
concave, this can be done using line search. However, we have found that a Successive
Under-Relaxation algorithm is faster.
Proposition 4: Assume that fj(x) is IFR with corresponding hazard rate hj(x). Further-




j (p)) < E for all p ∈ (0, p∞j ). Then, there exists
an ε > 0 such that the iterative process pkj (m) = αK/hj(p
k
j (m))+(1−α)pkj (m) will converge





Proof Define g(p) = αK/hj(p)+(1−α)p. Then the desired equilibrium price is the unique
fixed point of g(p). Furthermore, it is well known if there exists a 0 ≤ δ < 1 such that
||g′(p)|| < δ for all p ∈ (0, p∞j ), the iterative process defined in the proposition is contractive
and will converge to the fixed point ([Isaacson and Keller, 1966]). For the proposed process,
this condition is equivalent to:
0 < α <
2h2(p)
Kh′(p) + h2(p)
Set δ = 2KE+1 . Then, δ <
2h2(p)
Kh′(p)+h2(p) and any α < δ will generate a convergent sequence.
2.4.2 Computing Equilibrium Prices in a General Network
Recall that yk denotes the number of products that use at least one resource controlled by
controller k. Let Y = y1 + . . .+ yK and P ∈ RY denote the vector of controller actions (all
controller-price combinations), i.e., it consists of prices charged by each controller k for each
product j that she controls. We can always restructure P so that first n1 of its elements are
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prices of the products with single controllers. We also group the prices of a specific product
charged by different controllers together, i.e., P = [p1 p2 ... pn1 pn1+1,1 ... pn1+1,Kn1+1 ... pN,KN ]
T
(n1 + (n1 + 1) ∗Kn1+1 + ...+N ∗KN = Y ). Let ` be the index that enumerates the entries
of P . Also let µ = [µ1 ... µM ] be the vector of Lagrange multipliers.
Considering the optimality conditions derived in conditions (2.11) - (2.13), define the









aijbikµi ` = 1...Y











for some γ > 0. Then, we can apply the following Successive Under-Relaxation (SUR)
algorithm to compute the Nash equilibrium prices for Problem (2.1).
SUR Algorithm for Capacitated Networks:
Step 0: Initialize P 0 = [... pjk(0) ...] with 0 < pjk(0) < p
∞
j for all (j, k) and µ = 0. Set
t=0;
Step 1:
while |pjk(t)− pjk(t− 1)| > ε for any (j, k) pair and for some ε > 0
µt+1 = Z(µt)
P t+1 = αG(P t) + (1− α)P t where 0 < α ≤ 1 is the relaxation coefficient
t = t+ 1
end
Our convergence proof for this algorithm uses the following theorem.
Theorem 1: [Phillips, 1984]. Let S be a closed, convex subset of Rn. Let Q be the set of
transformations on Rn, H : S → S, with the following properties:
1. H is continuous and differentiable on S.




), is a norm everywhere in S.
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3. The eigenvalues of H
′
(P̃ ) are real for all P̃ ∈ S, and there exists a and b, a ≤ b < 1
such that all the eigenvalues of H
′
(P̃ ) lie between a and b for all P̃ ∈ S.
Let T ∈ Q. Then T has a unique fixed point P̃ ∗ ∈ S such that T (P̃ ∗) = P̃ ∗. Furthermore,
there exists an 0 < ε ≤ 1 such that the SUR algorithm will converge to this unique fixed
point for any 0 < α < ε.
Proposition 5: Assume that fj(x) is IFR with corresponding hazard rate hj(x) and
hj(0) > 0, ∀j. Then, there exists an 0 < α ≤ 1 such that the SUR Algorithm for
Capacitated Networks converges to the unique Nash equilibrium (NE).
Proof Let S = [0, p∞1 ]× ...× [0, p∞N ]. The first condition of Theorem 1 holds by assumption.
We show the third condition holds by proving that G
′
(P ) is negative semi-definite for
∀P ∈ S.
In every iteration t, after calculating the new µi’s, i.e. µi(t + 1)’s, we perform the
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and UKj is a Kj × Kj matrix of ones. The first term of βj is negative since the demand
distributions have the IFR property. The second term is also negative since γ > 0 and
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demand is a decreasing function of price. Hence βj < 0, ∀j. Therefore each Aj is negative
semi-definite, so G
′
(P ) is also negative semi-definite, which implies that all eigenvalues of
G
′
(P ) are non-positive ∀P ∈ S.
The smallest eigenvalue of G
′
(P ) is Kmaxβj̄ , where K
max = maxjKj and j̄ is the
index where that maximum occurs. Since we assume hj(0) > 0, ∀j and IFR, we have
hj(pjk) > 0, ∀P ∈ S, and hence 1hj(pjk) < ∞, ∀P ∈ S. The second term of βj̄ is bounded
by the assumption of regular demand functions. So, all the eigenvalues of G
′
(P ) are lower
bounded.
The second condition of Theorem 1 follows from the fact that G
′
(P ) is symmetric
(therefore, all its eigenvalues are real). Q.E.D.
Remark 4: Since the exponential demand function has a constant hazard rate, the first
term of βj vanishes. Hence we can make ‖G
′
(P )‖ < 1 by choosing γ sufficiently small,
which means that we can make G a contraction mapping for exponential demand func-
tions. Therefore, we can use a simple line search algorithm by taking α = 1 in the SUR
Algorithm for Capacitated Networks.
2.5 Numerical Analysis
We calculated the prices and consumers’ and producers’ surpluses under different regimes
for the networks shown in Figure 2.4. Network 1 is a serial network. The other networks
have “hub and spoke” structures such as those commonly found in airlines and supply
chains.
In Networks 1, 3, and 4, we calculated optimal prices under the two extreme con-
trol structures: fully centralized pricing (K = 1) and fully decentralized pricing (T =
{{1}, {2}, . . . , {M}}). For Network 2, we compared fully centralized pricing with the case
in which resources 1 and 2 had different controllers, but resources 3 and 4 had the same
controller (T = {{1}, {2}, {3, 4}}). In every case, we assume that there is a product for all
possible combinations of adjacent resources. We calculated optimal prices in each network
using both linear (λ(p) = (a − bp)+) and exponential (λ(p) = ea−bp) demand functions.
Parameter values for the demand functions can be found in the Appendix.
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Figure 2.4: Common network structures
We compared the centralized and decentralized network revenue and consumer surplus
under three different scenarios: (1) infinite capacity for every resource, (2) capacity levels
that only constrain the centralized problem, and (3) capacity levels that constrain both
centralized and decentralized problems. By Proposition 2, the prices for the multi-controller
scenarios will be higher than the centralized problem, so the capacity levels in scenario 2
are higher than those in scenario 3. The capacity levels that we used in our examples can be
found in the Appendix. Table 2.3 presents the changes in the total generated revenue and
consumer surplus from centralized to decentralized systems under these three scenarios.
We used the algorithms described in Section 2.4 to solve for the prices in each scenario.
As algorithm parameters, we chose ε = 10−6 and γ = 10−5. We used α = 0.1 for the linear
demand case and α = 1 for the exponential demand case and initialized all the prices to
one. The SUR algorithm converged quite quickly for these small examples –the longest
convergence time was 0.23 seconds for 780 iterations (for Network 4) using a laptop with
8GB RAM.
In all cases, total revenue was reduced by decentralization. Total consumer surplus
was usually reduced under decentralization, however, for Network 3 under Scenario 3, total
consumer surplus actually increased under decentralization for both the linear and expo-
nential demand functions. Under Scenario 3, the network is so highly constrained that all
of the capacity constraints are binding under both the centralized and decentralized cases.
When pricing is centralized, the prices of the single-resource products are higher than their
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Demand Change in Total Revenue Change in Total Consumer Surplus
Function Network Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Linear
1 -12.49% -10.75% -2.87% -41.37% -25.50% -1.02%
2 1-9.00% 1-5.65% -3.22% -33.06% -12.12% -3.76%
3 1-8.19% 1-8.00% -0.90% -40.96% -37.85% 5.73%
4 -12.66% 1-8.92% -4.87% -48.05% -30.84% -17.46%
Exponential
1 -30.86% -26.60% -13.70% -48.56% -31.00% -5.76%
2 -24.74% -22.32% -13.55% -41.39% -30.00% -8.41%
3 -18.51% -13.35% -2.09% -44.29% -20.74% 7.86%
4 -33.48% -30.04% -12.54% -57.20% -41.98% -5.35%
Table 2.3: Changes in total revenue and consumer surplus from centralized to decentralized
networks
optimal levels in order to satisfy the capacity constraints. Under decentralization, double
marginalization results in an increase in the price of the multi-resource products resulting
in a corresponding decrease in their demand. This increases the residual capacity available
for the single-product resources and their prices drop toward their centralized values. For
these cases, on the balance, the decreased prices of the single-resource products outweighed
the increased prices of the multi-resource products and both consumer surplus and total
surplus increased.
For the unconstrained problems, revenue and consumer surplus loss ratios are ordered
differently for the four networks: even though Network 2’s revenue loss ratio is larger than
Network 3, the case is reversed for the consumer surplus loss ratio. The reason is that
Network 2 has three products with two distinct controllers and Network 3 has 15 products
with two distinct controllers and the revenue loss ratio of products with two controllers is
smaller (9/8) than the consumer surplus loss ratio (9/4).
We also explored the effects of different type of control structures on the network revenue.
For Network 1 with unconstrained resources, we compared two control structures. In one
case there are two controllers, one managing resources 1 and 2 and the other managing 3
and 4. In the other case there are again two controllers, but one managing resources 1 and
3 and the other managing resources 2 and 4. When we use the same parameters as the
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Total Revenue Change
Centralized Decentralized
Resource # Capacity/UD∗ Linear Exponential Linear Exponential
1 0.5 -5.25% -3.02% -7.57% -5.70%
2 0.5 -5.72% -3.12% -8.11% -5.69%
3 0.5 -6.01% -3.51% -8.59% -6.81%
4 0.5 -12.77% -7.37% -18.51% -13.22%
5 0.5 -5.65% -2.98% -8.10% -5.66%
6 0.5 -5.90% -3.14% -8.49% -5.94%
7 0.5 -5.85% -3.40% -8.38% -6.45%
Table 2.4: Effects of capacity cuts on total network revenue for Network 4. *UD: Uncapac-
itated Demand
previous examples, the revenue and consumer surplus loss ratios are 4.93% and 24.63% for
the first control structure, and 6.79% and 33.97% for the second control structure. This is
in line with expectations since there are more products with multiple controllers under the
second control structure.
To answer the question of whether the capacity constraints of all the resources have
similar effects on the revenue losses, we decreased the capacity levels of resources one at
a time for the above network examples under both centralized and decentralized systems
and observed the effects on the total revenues. Table 2.5 presents the total revenue changes
from uncapacitated to one-resource-capacitated networks for Network 4: the decrease in
the total network revenue is significantly larger for a 50% cut in resource 4’s capacity (with
respect to the optimal/equilibrium demand in uncapacitated case) compared to similar cuts
in other resources’ capacities (we obtained similar results for the other network examples).
This distinction arises from the number of products that use each resource: cuts to the
capacities of the resources used by more products are more effective in revenue losses.
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2.6 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we showed that decentralized pricing in a network always leads to a reduction
in total product revenue relative to the fully centralized case and that more decentralization
leads to greater loss. In the case in which resources are unconstrained, decentralization also
leads to a loss of consumer surplus. We derived closed-form solutions for the revenue and
price as a function of the number of controllers for the cases in which product demand
curves are linear or exponential.
When resources have constrained capacity, the situation is more complex. Total revenue
always decreases as the number of controllers increases. However, in certain cases, consumer
surplus - and total social surplus - can actually increase. When the capacity constraint is
binding on one or more resources, closed form solutions are no longer available for price
or revenue. However, we show that a successive under-relaxation algorithm with suitable
choice of relaxation parameter is guaranteed to converge given mild assumptions on the
forms of the demand functions.
Our study in this chapter can be viewed as an extension of the well-known concept of
double marginalization (or horizontal externality) to networks: as the number of controllers
in an unconstrained network increases, both producer surplus and consumer surplus de-
creases relative to the single controller case. This indicates that there can be an increase in
consumer and producer surplus from the consolidation of network industries such as airlines
and pipelines in which there are many shared products prior to the merger.
CHAPTER 3. EFFECTS OF FIELD PRICE DISCRETION ON PROFITABILITY 42
Chapter 3
Effects of Field Price Discretion on
Profitability
In this chapter, we focus on understanding and improving pricing decisions in the case
when corporate headquarters set a list price for all products but local salespeople are given
discretion to adjust (or negotiate) prices for individual deals with set limits. This form
of pricing can be categorized under a more general pricing strategy –customized pricing–
and is called list pricing with discretion (LPD). It is commonly found in most business-to-
business markets and in certain business-to-consumer settings, including consumer lending,
insurance, real estate, and automobile sales. How much (if any) pricing discretion to grant
is a topic of controversy within many firms. We study this issue using two data sets - one
from an online lender who sets all prices centrally and one from an indirect lender with local
pricing discretion. We find that there is strong evidence that the indirect sales force adjusts
prices in a way that improves profitability. However, we also show that using a centralized,
data-driven pricing optimization system has the potential of improving profitability further.
In addition, the discretion applied by local sales staff introduces significant endogeneity
into the indirect lender’s pricing process. Ignoring this endogeneity can lead to severe
underestimation of price sensitivity. The use of two data sources allows us to attribute the
endogeneity to the actions of the local sales force rather than any general characteristic of
the auto loan market. We discuss the implications of these findings for auto lending and
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for other industries with similar pricing structures.
3.1 Auto Lending Sales and Pricing Processes
Our results in this chapter are based on analysis of two data sets of approved loan appli-
cations for two different auto lenders in the American market. “Customers” in the auto
lending market wish to borrow money to purchase a car, which serves as collateral for the
loan. Loans differ in terms of the amount borrowed (the size of the loan) and the loan dura-
tion (the term). The “price” of an automobile loan is determined by its Annual Percentage
Rate (APR). All of the loans in both data sets are simple loans with equal monthly pay-
ments. The monthly payment p for each loan can be calculated as a function of the initial
principal P , monthly APR r and term in months n according to the standard calculation
p = Pr(1 + r)n/[(1 + r)n − 1].
Our data is for two different lenders who each offered loans through different channels.
One lender offered loans exclusively through the Internet. We call this lender the on-line
lender. The second lender offered loans exclusively through automobile dealerships. We
call this lender the indirect lender. The on-line channel and the indirect channel differ both
in the selling and pricing process and in the information available to the lender at the time
of pricing. In the on-line channel, a prospective borrower fills out an on-line application
specifying her identity, information on the car she wishes to purchase, and the amount and
term of the loan she wants. Based on this information, the Internet lender first determines
whether they wish to extend a loan, based on an estimate of the default risk. To estimate
this risk, the lender will obtain information about the applicant’s credit history from a
credit agency such as TransUnion or Experian. If an applicant is approved, then the lender
determines which price (APR) to offer. After being approved and learning the price, the
applicant has 45 days to accept the loan. Applicants who do not accept the loan by the end
of this period are considered lost.
In contrast, loans through the indirect lender are sold during a face-to-face interaction at
a dealership. When a customer has indicated that she is interested in purchasing a vehicle,
she is typically sent to the Finance and Insurance (F&I) department of the dealership
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to discuss financing. An interested customer fills out a loan application which includes
information similar to that required for an on-line application. The F&I manager enters each
application into an automated system such as DealerTrack which transmits the application
to banks and specialized lenders. Each lender that receives the application can either decline
it or accept it. A lender that accepts an application will communicate the APR that it will
charge – the so-called lender rate. Assuming that the applicant has been approved for the
loan by at least one lender, the F&I representative will decide on an APR to quote to the
borrower. The rate paid by the customer – the so-called customer rate – is determined
through negotiation between the F&I representative and the customer1. Usually (but not
always), the customer rate is higher than the lender rate, in which case the dealer profits
from the difference between the two rates. In some cases, to make a sale, the dealership
may agree to a customer rate that is lower than the lender rate, in which case the dealership
will lose money on the financing which it will presumably make up through the margin on
the sale of the car. For more information on the auto loan pricing and sales process, see
[Caufield, 2012].
Although there are a number of differences between the two channels, the key difference
for our purpose is that the final price in the indirect channel is determined after face-to-
face interaction with the prospective borrower while there is no such interaction in the
Internet lending process. Moreover, financing auto loans is an important source of profit
for a dealership. F&I representatives are usually trained salespeople who are incentivized
to increase dealer profits from lending.
3.2 Price-Response Model Estimation
Our analysis is based on two data sets containing information on approved auto loans
from the on-line lender and the indirect lender. Both lenders have requested anonymity.
The data set for the on-line lender includes all approved applications from July 2002 to
November 2004. This consists of 152,963 approved applications, of which 26,322 (17%)
1The term “negotiation” is potentially misleading because there may not be any of the “back and forth”
between the F&I representative and the customer usually implied by the term. Some customers are not
aware that the rate is potentially negotiable and may accept it as a “take it or leave it” rate.
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were taken up and resulted in loans2. The indirect lender data set includes information
on all approved applications during a multi-year period starting January 20093. There are
2,138,691 approvals in this data set of which 1,473,786 (69%) were taken up.
We are interested in predicting the probability of take-up for these two lenders and in
particular how the probability of take-up changes as a function of the APR. Our first step is
to estimate uncorrected take-up models based on probit regression with take-up as a target
variable. We call these the base models. We test the base models for endogeneity due to
unrecorded variables. Our hypothesis is that the indirect lending data will demonstrate a
much higher degree of endogeneity than the on-line lending data due to the face-to-face
lending process. We use a control function approach to correct both models for endogene-
ity and compare the results. Once this has been done, we can estimate the additional
profitability (if any) resulting from the use of pricing discretion by dealers of the indirect
lender.
3.2.1 Base Price-Response Models
The variables used in the base models are shown in Table 3.1. Both lenders categorized
applications into risk tiers based on estimated default risk. The on-line lender categorized
borrowers into four risk tiers; the indirect lender used five tiers. In both cases, riskiness
increased with tier – i.e., Tier 1 applications were considered the least risky. Each lender
used its own methodology to estimate risk and assign applications to tiers and, as a result,
the tiers are not directly comparable. We included both the prime rate and ∆Rate – defined
as the difference between the APR of a deal (CustomerRate) and the current prime rate –
as explanatory variables. The prime rate is a measure of the current cost of funds common
to all lenders while the APR is set by the lender and is potentially different for every deal.
Using Prime Rate and ∆Rate enables us to separate the effect of industry-wide cost levels
from deal-specific pricing decisions and, since ∆Rate = CustomerRate − PrimeRate it is
2This data set is available from the Columbia Center for Pricing and Revenue Management website at
www.cprm.columbia.edu.
3The indirect lender requested that the exact period under consideration be withheld in order to preserve
confidentiality.
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Variable Name Comment On-line Indirect
Tier Risk-based classification of borrowers Y Y
F̂ ICO Normalized FICO Score Y Y
Term Term of the loan (Months) Y Y
Vehicle Type New or Used Y Y
Vehicle Model Civic, Corolla, Focus, etc. N Y
Prime Rate 1-month LIBOR rate at time of approval Y Y
Amount Size of the loan ($1,000) Y Y
∆Rate APR - Prime Rate Y Y
Dealer ID Dealer-specific source of the transaction NA Y
Partner Bin Source of on-line query Y NA
Customer Cash Cash incentive provided by supplier via indirect channel ($1,000) N Y
Subvention Was the APR offered a promotional rate? (Y/N) NA Y
Table 3.1: Data elements and descriptions for on-line and indirect data sets. Y: data is
available, N: data is not available, NA: not applicable
equivalent to using PrimeRate and CustomerRate.
Both data sets included the FICO score associated with each approved application.
FICO score is an industry standard individual risk score which ranges from 300 to 850, with
higher values representing lower risk. For both data sets, FICO score is highly correlated
with risk tier, however both lenders used additional information such as the size of the loan
or number of credit cards that the borrower owns (which can be determined through the
credit agencies) to classify potential borrowers into risk tiers. For each lender and risk tier,
we calculated the average FICO score. For each application, we then calculated a normalized
FICO score, F̂ ICO as the difference between the FICO score on that application and the
average FICO score of the application’s risk tier. This gave us a measure of individual
application risk that is not correlated with risk tier.
There are two promotion-based variables that are only relevant to the indirect lender.
Two types of promotions were offered at various times through the indirect lender. Under
a “customer cash” deal, the vehicle manufacturer offered a cash rebate to the customer.
The variable CustomerCash measures the size of this rebate (if it was offered). Under a
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“subvention” deal, the vehicle manufacturer subsidized the lender in order to offer a reduced
APR. For example, a manufacturer might offer 1.0% financing for all sales of a particular
model in the month of May. In this case, the manufacturer pays the lender for the difference
in expected profit between pricing the loan at the list APR and at the reduced APR. This
payment is called a subvention. The availability of a subvened rate is recorded for borrowers
who did not take up a loan as well as for those who took up the loan in the indirect lender
data. There were no subvened deals offered by the on-line lender during the data period
and customer cash information was not available for on-line lender applications.
We note that, for most data sets of similar type, the availability of a subvened rate may
not be recorded for borrowers who did not take up a loan. This creates a hidden data prob-
lem. However, as noted above, subvened rates are typically offered to certain borrowers for
certain models in certain geographies during certain periods of time. Hence, CART (Clas-
sification and Regression Trees) can be used to determine which combinations of borrower
type, model, and period received subvened loans and the average level of subvention. We
can then impute the same subvened rate for the same combinations of approved borrower
type, model and period for borrowers who did not take up the loan.
We used a categorical variable V ehicleModelByMonth to group loans for the same
vehicle model in the same month in the indirect lender base model. This variable is included
to account for differences in CustomerRate resulting from common demand shocks due to
possible vehicle model based pricing and/or promotions. There were initially 2055 categories
in the V ehicleModelByMonth variable, however we excluded categories with less than 10
observations (0.06% of the data), which resulted in 1628 categories. Since there were no
model-based promotions offered by the on-line lender we only included the month of each
observation – denoted Month – in the on-line model.
Dealer ID in the indirect data set indicates which dealer originated the loan. Dealer
ID is included in the indirect lender base price-response model as a categorical variable in
order to incorporate dealer-specific effects in the price-response model, such as differences in
competitive intensity. The data set included loans originated from 7730 distinct dealers. We
excluded dealers with fewer than 10 transactions, corresponding to 1.6% of the transactions,
resulting in 6103 distinct dealers in our final data set. Region indicators are not included
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On-line Lender Indirect Lender
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FICO Score 727.34 45.43 594 854 721.84 87.06 330 900
Term (Months) 58.03 10.53 36 72 61.37 11.61 6 96
Amount ($) 28,551 10,791 4,770 100,000 24,497 11,073 1,000 120,000
Customer Rate (%) 5.47 1.52 2.45 13.9 5.99 4.90 0 38.79
Prime Rate (%) 1.32 0.24 1.02 1.84 0.27 0.07 0.18 0.56
Competitor’s Rate (%) 4.71 0.58 2.99 6.45 NA
Cash Incentive ($) NA 629 1,064 0 9,000
Table 3.2: Summary statistics for continuous variables
in the indirect models since the dealer-specific dummies capture regional effects as well.
Loan applicants for the on-line lender either arrived directly to the lender’s website
or were directed to the website from another site. The on-line lender had an exclusive
commission agreement with one site (“Partner A”) for referrals. This site was the source of
about 14% of approved loan applications. Our analysis showed that there was a significant
difference in price sensitivity among customers who came directly to the lender’s website
versus those who were directed from Partner A’s website versus those who were directed
from other websites. We therefore created the categorical variable PartnerBin to separate
applications into these three categories.
The majority of loans offered by these lenders fell into a relatively small number of
terms. For example, there are many 60 months loans but very few (or no) 59 month or 61
month loans. We created a categorical variable TermClass which could take on the values
(0− 36], (36− 48], (48− 60] or > 60, where the term is specified in months.
We used Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) to estimate variable coefficients for
probit price-response functions for both lenders. This is a standard approach for price-
response estimation in similar situations ([Phillips, 2005; Phillips, 2012a], [Agrawal and
Ferguson, 2007]). Using the probit model allows us to apply well-developed approaches
for detecting and adjusting for endogeneity ([Wooldridge, 2002]) –using a logit model for
the base model did not make a significant difference in either the model fit statistics or
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On-line Lender Indirect Lender
Variable Category Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Tier
1 74,890 48.96 1,053,411 49.25
2 32,047 20.95 430,434 20.13
3 28,465 18.61 382,349 17.88
4 17,561 11.48 111,530 5.22
5 NA 160,967 7.52
Vehicle Type
New 115,531 75.53 1,683,542 78.72
Used 37,432 24.47 455,149 21.28
Partner Bin
Direct 62,982 41.17
Partner A 20,905 13.67 NA
Other Partners 69,076 54.84
Customer’s Decision
Not Take 126,641 82.79 664,905 31.09
Take 26,322 17.21 1,473,786 68.91
Table 3.3: Summary statistics for categorical variables
the signs of the coefficients (coefficient estimates for both on-line and indirect base models
using logistic regression can be found in Section 3.4). We used standard variable selection
techniques and also tried different variable transformations as well as crossing the rate
variable with other variables. For both base models we performed holdout sample validation
by estimating the model on a randomly chosen training set and testing the take up on the
remaining validation (or test) set. We performed this validation test for each of the two
models while adding and removing each explanatory variable one at a time. The models
shown have the highest predictive performance of all the models we tested based on this
procedure. Alternative models that use different specifications and definitions of some of
the variables are discussed in Section 3.4.
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 list the continuous and categorical variables, respectively, that
were used in the final base models along with some summary statistics. Table 3.4 shows the
coefficients for the explanatory variables in the final base models. The coefficients for Dealer
ID,Month, and V ehicleModelByMonth are not shown for brevity. Note that every variable
was significant at p < .01 with the lone exception of PrimeRate, which is highly correlated
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with V ehicleModelByMonth and Month. 1216 out of the 1628 V ehicleModelByMonth
categories were significant at the .05 level. Both models showed quite high levels of con-
cordance: 87.3% for the on-line lender and 87% for the indirect lender4. The base models
are similar in structure and in coefficients to models that have been used by the lenders to
predict take-up. For the most part, the coefficient signs are intuitive. All of the coefficients
for ∆Rate by tier are negative, indicating that higher APR’s lead to lower take up, as ex-
pected. For the on-line lender, applications referred from partners are less likely to convert
than applications coming directly to the site.
The interactions of take-up rate, APR, and risk are notable. In general, lenders observe
that, all else being equal, riskier customers tend to be less price-sensitive and have higher
overall take up rates. This is related to the phenomenon of price-dependent risk ([Phillips
and Raffard, 2011]). This phenomenon is observable in the on-line model in which the
magnitude of the ∆Rate coefficients decrease with tier as expected. Price-dependent risk
is not immediately observable in the indirect base model in which there is no clear trend in
∆Rate by risk tier. This suggests that the coefficient estimates may be biased.
3.2.2 Endogeneity Correction
A key question is the extent to which the base price-response model coefficients suffer from
endogeneity. If the rates offered for loans are influenced by factors correlated with customer
price-sensitivity that are not captured in the data, then the base model coefficients may be
severely biased. To correct for endogeneity, we use a control function approach in which
the endogenous variable (in this case, Rate) is regressed against exogenous instruments,
and the residual from this regression is entered as an additional explanatory variable to the
price-response models. While there are other methods available to control for endogeneity,
the control function approach is best suited to our situation5. Two-stage least squares is
4The concordance of a model is defined as the percentage of distinct pairs i, j : i 6= j with ŷi 6= ŷj such
that sgn[ŷj − ŷi] = sgn[yj − yi] where ŷj and yj are the model estimate and the actual value of the response
variable for customer j respectively.
5A more detailed literature review for the endogeneity correction methods and their application areas
can be found in the Appendix B
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Tier 4 -0.80∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
5 NA 0.01∗∗∗




Term Class 60 0.71∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗∗
≥66 1.51∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗
2 -1.98∗∗∗
Dealer ID : NA :
6103 -1.53∗∗∗
2 -0.03∗∗∗
Month : : NA
12 0.09∗∗∗
2 -1.16∗∗∗
Vehicle Model By Month : NA :
1628 0.17∗∗∗
Vehicle Type Used 1.42∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗
Subvention Offer NO NA -1.53∗∗∗
F̂ ICO (/100) -0.30∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗
Log(Amount) -1.39∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
Prime Rate 5.15∗∗* 9.67∗∗∗
Customer Cash ($1,000) NA 1.12∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 1 -80.35∗∗∗ -7.54∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 2 -55.25∗∗∗ -5.07∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 3 -42.34∗∗∗ -4.53∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 4 -38.00∗∗∗ -7.32∗∗*
∆Rate for Tier 5 NA -4.33∗∗∗
Concordance 87.3% 87%
Log-likelihood -45,297 -893,780.7
Table 3.4: Base probit model coefficients.
Significance levels: ***: < 0.01; **: < 0.05; *: < 0.10
CHAPTER 3. EFFECTS OF FIELD PRICE DISCRETION ON PROFITABILITY 52
commonly used in linear models but it cannot be easily extended to non-linear models such
as logit or probit ([Foster, 1997]). Furthermore, the control function approach is better
suited to non-linear models with continuous endogenous variables than the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) approach. In particular, when some endogenous variables are
continuous, as is the case in our situation, the control function approach makes it much
easier to test the endogeneity of a variable as well as compute the average partial effects of
each variable ([Wooldridge, 2002]).
Following [Petrin and Train, 2010], we assume that the utility that consumer n would
achieve from accepting a loan offer can be written as
Un = V (yn, xn, β) + εn
where yn is the observed endogenous variable, xn is a vector of observed exogenous vari-
ables, β is a vector of parameters, and εn denotes the unobserved component of utility.
Endogeneity occurs when εn is correlated with yn. The binary response model is:
Dn = 1(Un>0)
where Dn denotes the decision of customer n.
The idea behind the control function correction is to derive an auxiliary variable that
conditions on the part of the endogenous variable that depends on the unobserved com-
ponent of utility, i.e., the error term. Then, the remaining variation in the endogenous
variable becomes independent of the error term, so the results of standard estimation tech-
niques become unbiased. This approach assumes that yn can be written as
yn = W (xn, zn; γ) + µn (3.1)
where zn denotes the instrumental variables that do not enter utility directly but affect yn.
γ denotes parameters of W , and µn denotes the unobserved component. Note that µn and
εn are independent of xn and zn, but are not independent of each other. The source of
the dependence between yn and εn is the fact that µn affects yn and is correlated with εn.
Under these assumptions, conditional on µn, εn is independent of yn ([Petrin and Train,
2010]).
CHAPTER 3. EFFECTS OF FIELD PRICE DISCRETION ON PROFITABILITY 53
Decomposing εn into the part that can be explained by a general function of µn and the
residual yields:
εn = CF (µn;λ) + ε̃n
where CF (µn;λ) denotes the control function with parameters λ. Several parametric forms
might be assumed for CF (µn;λ). We assume that the errors in both equations, µn and εn,
are jointly normal, which is equivalent to assuming that the control function is linear in µn
(the analysis goes through if we use a nonlinear approximation provided we have sufficient
identifying assumptions), since
CF (µn;λ) = E(εn|µn) = λµn
and the deviations ε̃n = εn − CF (µn;λ) are independent of µn and all other regressors.
Then the utility function becomes:
Un = V (yn, xn, β) + λµn + ε̃n
where ε̃n are i.i.d normal with zero mean. Since we assume fixed β for every consumer,
the model becomes an independent probit with the residual entering as an extra variable.
Hence, this model specification coincides with a price-response model commonly used in
customized pricing environments, which indeed motivated our selection of this specification6.
The inclusion of the residuals µn “controls” for the endogeneity of yn in the original equation
(with sampling error, since µn 6= µ̂n).
Following the assumptions stated in [Wooldridge, 2002], we use the two-step approach
developed by [Rivers and Vuong, 1988]:
1. Perform an OLS regression of the endogenous variable, y, on the exogenous variables,
x, and instruments, z, to obtain the residuals, µ̂.
2. Perform a probit regression of the take-up variable on the exogenous variables, x,
endogenous variable, y, and µ̂ to estimate the (unnormalized) coefficients.






n and µn are jointly normal and ε
2
n is
i.i.d. extreme value. This specification leads to a mixed logit model as specified in [Villas-Boas and Winer,
1999].
CHAPTER 3. EFFECTS OF FIELD PRICE DISCRETION ON PROFITABILITY 54
Testing the null hypothesis that y is exogenous is straightforward. Asymptotically, a
simple t test on µ̂ is valid to test
H0 : λ = 0
If this t statistic is sufficiently large, meaning µ̂ is significant in the probit regression, we
can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that y is endogenous.
If λ turns out to be nonzero, then we need to normalize the coefficient estimates from
the Stage 2 regression, since V ar(ε̃n) < V ar(εn). As noted in [Petrin and Train, 2010],
normalizing by setting V ar(ε̃n) = 1 increases the magnitude of coefficients with respect to
the normalization V ar(εn) = 1. Following [Wooldridge, 2002], we normalized the coefficient
estimates by the factor (λ̂2τ̂2 + 1)1/2, where λ̂ is the coefficient of µ̂n and τ̂
2 is the error
variance estimator from the first stage regression of y on (x, z).
The probit standard errors and test statistics calculated in the Step 2 regression are
not accurate because the regression includes the residual from the first stage regression, µn,
which induces additional error. The second step uses an estimate of µn from the first step,
as opposed to the true µn, hence the sampling variance of the second-step estimator needs
to take this extra source of variation into account. A standard procedure for estimating the
true standard errors is to use bootstrapping ([Petrin and Train, 2002]). In this procedure,
the variance in the probit estimates over the bootstrapped first stage samples is added to the
sampling variance calculated in Step 2. We repeatedly estimated the first stage regression
with bootstrapped samples, obtained the residuals, and estimated the second step model
with the new residuals. The variance in the estimates over the bootstrapped first stage
samples was added to the sampling variance to estimate the true standard error. We report
the p-values calculated using this procedure in our results.
3.2.3 Results
The first step in applying the methodology described in the previous section is to choose
instrumental variables. For each application, we calculated the average of the interest rates
that are offered for similar applications in other regions during the same month. We denote
this variable by R̂ate. To calculate R̂ate, we clustered loans based on their size. For each
observation, R̂ate is the average rate offered on loans in the same size cluster with the same
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Term, Vehicle Type, and subvention eligibility condition in other pricing regions7 during
the same month. This Hausman-type instrument ([Hausman, 1997]) is appropriate since it
shares the same marginal cost characteristics with the endogenous CustomerRate. Also, it
averages out the unrecorded customer characteristics, so the instrument is uncorrelated with
the error term. Additionally, it does not reflect common demand shocks such as unobserved
local advertising or regional promotions. Finally, even though the aggregated auto sales
might be correlated across regions, the promotions/advertising strategy of the financing
deals for the cars are geographically versatile enough (at least for the indirect lender) so
that the CustomerRate demonstrates sufficient regional variation which justifies the use of
R̂ate as an instrument8.
Using this instrument, we applied the procedure described in Section 3.2.2. For the
first stage, we ran an Ordinary Least Squares regression of CustomerRate on the exogenous
variables and the instrument (R̂ate). Table 3.5 shows the coefficient estimates for these
linear regressions. The first stage R2 values are .82 and .78 for the on-line and indirect
lenders, respectively. For neither lender was CustomerRate fully predicted by the exogenous
variables and the instruments. The on-line lender performed a number of pricing tests and
experiments during the period covered by our data. The additional variation in the indirect
lender prices is due to the discretion applied by F&I Managers.
For the second stage, we took the residuals of this first stage regression, denoted Residual
for Rate, and ran a probit regression of “Customer’s Decision” on all the exogenous variables,
the endogenous variable (∆Rate), and Residual for Rate. Table 3.6 shows the results of these
regressions for the two data sets along with the coefficients from the base model. These
estimates are normalized as described in Section 3.2.2.
As shown in Table 3.6, all of the variables that entered the base models with high
significance (p < .01) also entered with high significance in the corrected models. 1104
out of the 1628 V ehicleModelByMonth variable categories were significant at the .05 level
for the corrected model. The Residual for Rate variable was not significant for the on-
7The indirect lender had 22 pricing regions across the US.
8 We used various other weak instrument tests (e.g., F-test) as well to validate our choice of instrument.
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Explanatory Variable On-line Indirect
Intercept -1.168∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
1 0.012∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗
Tier 2 0.025∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(Base levels: 4 and 5) 3 0.013∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
4 NA -0.021∗∗∗
Partner Direct Auto Finance Company 0.022∗∗∗
NA
(Base level: Other) Partner A 0.109∗∗∗
36 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
Term Class 48 0.011∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(Base levels: ≥66) 60 -0.006∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
1 -0.015∗∗∗
Dealer ID : NA :
(Base level: 6103) 6102 -0.015∗∗∗
1 -0.090∗∗∗
Month : : NA
(Base level: 12) 11 -0.075∗∗∗
1 0.006∗∗∗
Vehicle Model By Month : NA :
(Base level: 1628) 1627 -0.003∗∗∗
Vehicle Type New -0.014∗** -0.016∗∗∗
Subvention Offer NO NA 0.011∗∗∗
F̂ ICO (/100) -0.271∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
Log(Amount) -0.005∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
Prime Rate 0.950∗∗∗ -0.448∗∗∗
Customer Cash ($1,000) NA 0.014∗∗∗
R̂ate 1.001∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗
R2 82% 78%
F Value 28056.6 1035.96
Table 3.5: First stage linear regression coefficients.
Significance levels: ***: < 0.01; **: < 0.05; *: < 0.10
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line lender9 (p = .58) but was highly significant for the indirect lender (p < .0001). This
is consistent with the hypothesis that endogeneity exists in the indirect lender data and
not in the on-line lender data. Furthermore, the difference between the coefficients of the
corrected model and the base model for the on-line lender are quite small and do not result
in any changes in sign or significant changes in relative magnitude.
In the indirect model, most of the coefficients not associated with rate did not change
significantly when the model is corrected for endogeneity. The sign of the coefficient of
LogAmount changed from positive to negative, consistent with the expectation that, all
else being equal, take-up rates are smaller for larger loans. On the other hand, many of the
coefficients related to APR changed significantly. In particular, the ∆Rate by Tier variables
increased in magnitude by factors ranging from 203% to 387%. This implies that the base
model significantly underestimated price-sensitivity for the indirect lender.
Table 3.7 shows the corrected and uncorrected price elasticities for the two models10.
We used the mean levels of each continuous variable and the most common levels of each
categorical variable11 to calculate these estimates. We also averaged out the intercept
adjustments of the dealers to report the average elasticities over all customers instead of
the average elasticity of a single dealer’s customers. Correcting for endogeneity increased the
estimates of elasticity for the indirect lender by factors ranging from 126% to 285%. Figure
3.1 shows the endogeneity corrected price-response models together with the uncorrected
(base) ones for each risk tier for both indirect and on-line lenders.
From Table 3.7, it can be seen that the corrected estimates of price-elasticities are much
higher (by an order of magnitude) for the on-line lender than for the indirect lender. There
are several possible explanations for this:
1. Experience in other lending industries has shown that on-line channels are typically
9We ruled out the possibility that this was the result of multicollinearity using the condition index test
([Lesaffre and Marx, 1993]).
10Table 3.7 reports only one set of elasticities for the on-line model, since, for this model, endogeneity
correction did not change the estimations significantly.
11One exception is that we used the non-subvened level of “Subvention Offer” variable in the indirect
model, since the mean rate that we used was more consistent with a non-subvened offer.
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Explanatory On-line Indirect
Variable Base Corrected Base Corrected
Intercept 14.76∗∗∗ 14.78∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 3.62∗∗∗
2 -0.62∗∗∗ -0.60∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
3 -0.94∗∗∗ -0.92∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
Tier 4 -0.80∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
5 NA 0.01∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗
Partner Partner A -0.40∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ NA
Other -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ NA
48 0.27∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗
Term Class 60 0.71∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗
≥66 1.51∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗ -0.38∗∗∗
2 -1.98∗∗∗ -2.00∗∗∗
Dealer ID : NA : :
6103 -1.53∗∗∗ -1.60∗∗∗
2 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
Month : : : NA
12 0.09∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
2 -1.16∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗
Vehicle Model By Month : NA : :
1628 0.17∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
Vehicle Type Used 1.42∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗
Subvention Offer NO NA -1.53∗∗∗ -0.78∗∗∗
F̂ ICO (/100) -0.30∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗
Log(Amount) -1.39∗∗∗ -1.39∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
Prime Rate 5.15∗∗* 5.08∗∗* 9.67∗∗∗ -9.94∗∗∗
Customer Cash ($1,000) NA 1.12∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 1 -80.35∗∗∗ -81.62∗∗∗ -7.54∗∗∗ -22.84∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 2 -55.25∗∗∗ -56.54∗∗∗ -5.07∗∗∗ -20.93∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 3 -42.34∗∗∗ -43.63∗∗∗ -4.53∗∗∗ -20.80∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 4 -38.00∗∗∗ -39.29∗∗∗ -7.32∗∗* -23.73∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 5 NA -4.33∗∗∗ -21.87∗∗∗
Residual for Rate 1.41∗∗∗ 19.53∗∗∗
Table 3.6: Endogeneity corrected choice model (probit) estimates.
Significance Levels: ***: < 0.01; **: < 0.05; *: < 0.10













-3% 0% 3% 6% 9% 12% 15% 18% 21% 24% 27% 30%
Tier 1 




























-3% 0% 3% 6% 9% 12% 15% 18% 21% 24% 27% 30%
Tier 2 




























-3% 0% 3% 6% 9% 12% 15% 18% 21% 24% 27% 30%
Tier 3 




























-3% 0% 3% 6% 9% 12% 15% 18% 21% 24% 27% 30%
Tier 4 




























-3% 0% 3% 6% 9% 12% 15% 18% 21% 24% 27% 30%
Tier 5 




























-4% -3% -2% -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12%
















Figure 3.1: Estimated price response functions for indirect and on-line lenders
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On-line Lender Indirect Lender
Uncorrected With Control Function
For Tier 1 -3.26 -0.38 -1.10
For Tier 2 -2.16 -0.26 -0.96
For Tier 3 -1.60 -0.22 -0.85
For Tier 4 -1.34 -0.35 -0.80
For Tier 5 NA -0.21 -0.54
Table 3.7: Estimated price elasticities
more price-sensitive than indirect or direct channels. In particular, it is very easy to
compare competing prices on-line, while it is difficult for a borrower to compare other
prices when she is sitting in the F&I office of a dealership. It is also possible that
there is a selection effect – that more price-sensitive customers preferentially choose
the on-line channel due to the ease of price-comparison in the channel.
2. The two data sets span different periods of time. During the 2002-2004 period covered
by the on-line lender data set, consumer credit was more widely available than in the
post-crisis period covered by the indirect lender data set (starting from 2009). This
means that borrowers in the earlier period may have had access to more alternative
sources of credit than in the later period. This differential access to credit could
manifest itself in the data as decreased price-sensitivity in the later period.
3. The prices (and ∆Rates) set by the two lenders for similar loans are not the same.
Since elasticities are not constant across prices, this might lead to elasticity differences
between the two lenders.
4. Finally, it is possible that there is additional endogeneity remaining in the indirect
lending data that has not been captured by our choice of instruments. This would
lead to underestimation of price sensitivity in the indirect channel.
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3.3 Quantifying the Value of Field Price Discretion
Having corrected for the endogeneity caused by field price discretion, we can next turn to
estimating its benefits. This requires answering two counterfactual questions: (1) what rate
other than the actual rate would have been quoted in the absence of field price discretion and
(2) how would customers have responded to these rates? To answer the latter question, we
used the endogeneity corrected price-response models which accurately calculates potential
customer responses to the nominal centralized rate (that is, the rate that would be used
absent any dealer discretion) estimates12. To address the former question, we used four
different approaches, which we discuss next.
3.3.1 Centralized Pricing Benchmark Methods
3.3.1.1 Projected Rate Method
In this method, we used the projected rates from the first stage (linear) regression of the
control function approach as our estimates of the rates that would have been charged in
the absence of discretion. The justification for using these projected rates comes from the
assumptions of the control function approach. As stated in equation (3.1), the endogenous
rate variable can be written as the sum of two parts: a function of the available exogenous
variables and instruments (W (xn, zn; γ)), and an unobserved component (µn), which is an
indicator of the unrecorded transaction characteristics affecting the pricing process. We
estimate these two parts in the first stage (linear) regression of the Rivers and Vuong
method, taking the projected rates as the nominal centralized rates and the residuals as
the adjustments due to field price discretion. We note that, while using this method, we
implicitly assume that the pricing function (W ) does not change between the two scenarios.
12Endogeneity correction is further crucial for such a counterfactual analysis. [Ebbes et al., 2011] states
that it is necessary to correct for endogeneity when the goal is a better explanation of the customer behaviour
in a different environment instead of better predictions in the same environment.
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3.3.1.2 Lender Rate Method
The indirect lender data set contains the lender rates (also known as “price-list rates”)
for each transaction. As explained in Section 3.1, this is the rate that the indirect lender
will charge the dealer for the loan. The rate paid by the customer – the customer rate –
is then determined through negotiation between the F&I representative and the customer.
Indeed, the customer rates are different than the lender rates for 57.02% of the non-subvened
observations (39.19% of customer rates are more than the lender rates and 17.83% of them
are less than the lender rates). Using the lender rates as the nominal centralized rates
provides another benchmark for field price discretion. However, we note that the indirect
lender calculates the lender rates knowing that field price discretion will be applied by the
dealers. Hence, the lender rates may not be the centralized rates that the lender would
charge in the absence of field price discretion.
3.3.1.3 Profit Maximizing Rate Method
Our third approach to estimating centralized rates is to use the estimated probit model to
maximize profits. In particular, we divided the data into two parts based on the transaction
date: we used the first part, which covers the period up to the last 12 months, as a “training
set” and estimated the endogeneity corrected probit model using these data. Then, for
the remaining “test set”, which covers the last 12 months, we calculated the rates that
maximize expected profit based on the estimated model and used these as the estimates of
the centralized rates. Specifically, we found the rates that maximize
ExpectedProfitj(r) =TakeUp Probabilityj(r) ∗ [PoPj ∗ (TotalPaymentj(r)− Principalj)
(3.2)
−(1− PoPj) ∗ LGD ∗ Principalj ]
and substitute these rates in equation (3.4) to calculate the counterfactual profits. Here,
PoP denotes the “probability of payment” which is calculated by the indirect lender based
on their estimates of the default risk of each loan and LGD denotes the “loss-given-default”
ratio. We set LGD = .5, which is the value used by the indirect lender. Note that the
take-up probability in equation (3.2) is calculated using the choice model estimated for
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the training set. We used pricing regions instead of Dealer ID variables, since indirect
lender sets list rates by region but not by dealer. Additionally, since the indirect lender
cannot utilize the V ehicleModelByMonth dummies in its optimization, we averaged out
the fixed effects originating from these variables. We also imposed the constraint that the
customer rate for any transaction cannot exceed the lender rate by more than 2.00% (200
basis points). This is consistent with the current policy of the lender.
3.3.1.4 Field Price Discretion with Profit Maximizing Rates Method
In this method, we added the residuals from the first stage (linear) regression of the Rivers
and Vuong method, µn, to the profit maximizing rates calculated for the previous (third)
benchmark and used these rates as our estimates of the centralized rates. Because these
residuals are estimates of the adjustments due to field price discretion, using this method
enables us to estimate the effects of field price discretion in case centralized, data-driven
profit maximizing rates are given to the dealers.
3.3.2 Results
For each benchmark method, we compared the profits of the method with the actual profits.
We estimated the profitability as:
ActualProfitj = [PoPj ∗ (TotalPaymentj − Principalj) (3.3)
−(1− PoPj) ∗ LGD ∗ Principalj ] ∗Booked Indicatorj
BenchmarkProfitj = [PoPj ∗ (TotalPaymentj − Principalj) (3.4)
−(1− PoPj) ∗ LGD ∗ Principalj ] ∗ Conditional TakeUp Probabilityj
whereActualProfit is the profit that was achieved from the acceptance andBenchmarkProfit
is our focal estimate of the expected profit that would have been achieved if the dealer had
used rates from the benchmark method. The conditional take-up probability is defined as:
Conditional TakeUp Probabilityj(r̂) = P (taking up the loan at rate r̂ | customer’s
decision at rate = CustomerRate)
(3.5)






ProfitMaxRate with field price discretion 7.70%*
Table 3.8: Average rates for the indirect lender “non-subvened” customers (*: Test set
customers only –mean of CustomerRate for the test set is 6.85%)
Mean Mean Profit
Benchmark Method ActualProfit BenchmarkProfit Difference
ProjectedRate $2,920* $2,639* -9.62%
LenderRate $2,920* $2,764* -5.34%
ProfitMaxRate $2,701* $3,410* 26.25%
ProfitMaxRate with field price discretion $2,701* $3,426* 26.84%
Table 3.9: Profit change under field price discretion for the indirect lender (*: Test set
customers only)
If the lender offers a non-negotiable rate that is lower than an accepted rate (higher than
a rejected rate), we assume that the same customer would accept (reject) the loan offer.
For the other cases, we calculate the conditional take-up probability using the endogeneity
corrected price-response model. Profit changes are calculated as: (BenchmarkProfitj −
ActualProfitj)/ActualProfitj .
We considered only the non-subvened observations for the indirect lender in this analysis
(46.62% of the data), because dealers have very limited authority to adjust rates for the
subvened loans. Table 3.8 presents the mean of the actual and benchmark rates used in
this analysis. Table 3.9 shows the average profit changes for each benchmark relative to
the status quo profits. As can be seen in Table 3.9, the estimated profits of the first two
benchmarks, the projected rate method and the lender rate method, are significantly lower
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than the actual profit –differences are -9.62% and -5.34%, respectively13. These suggest
that dealers were in fact adjusting the rates in a way that improved profitability.
When we use the third benchmark, the profit maximizing rate method, the alternative
profit turned out to be higher than the actual profit by 26.25%. This result suggests that
even though the dealers were improving profits relative to the nominal rates set by the
lender, there was an additional opportunity to improve profitability further.
Finally, the highest levels of profit are achieved when a combination of analytical, data-
driven profit maximization procedure and field price discretion is used. In particular, using
the field price discretion with profit maximizing rates method improved the profit increase of
the profit maximizing rate method relative to the status quo profits by 0.6%. This suggests
that even though dealer price discretion appeared to improve profits using historic lender
rates or projected rates, the profit improvement due to field price discretion is much less
significant when the lender rates have been optimized.
We make two observations from these experiments regarding the endogeneity correc-
tion of the price-response models. The first is that the profit increase under field price
discretion is significantly underestimated when the uncorrected (base) model is used to cal-
culate profits, since customers are estimated to be less price-sensitive in that model. The
second observation is that when we use the uncorrected model in the profit maximization
procedure, the resulting profit maximizing rates turned out to be much higher than the
ones reported in Table 3.8 (the mean was around 30%). This is again intuitive due to the
estimation of less price-sensitive customers. Hence, we conclude that not accounting for
endogeneity would lead to substantial mispricing for this lender.
13We also compared the on-line lender current profits with the projected rate benchmark. The current
profits were only .76% more than this benchmark. This difference is small as expected because the on-line
lender was already using a centralized pricing system. We note that in these calculations we did not take the
default risk into account due to lack of PoP estimates in its data set, however calculations with estimated
average PoP ’s for each tier did not change the results significantly.
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3.4 Robustness Analysis
We tested the robustness of the base models and corrected models by using different variable
transformations, model specifications, and by including alternative variables. For the on-
line lender model, including lender region changed neither the coefficient estimations nor
did it improve model fit. This was consistent with the fact that the on-line lender did not
use regional pricing during the period covered by the data.
We tested different specifications of the CustomerRate, Prime Rate, and F̂ ICO vari-
ables in both models. The F̂ ICO variable is the absolute value of the difference between
a customer’s FICO score and the average FICO score for his risk tier. Replacing the abso-
lute value with the percentage difference did not significantly change any of the coefficient
estimates nor did it improve the model fit. We also tested the percentage difference of
the CustomerRate compared to Prime Rate in our choice models. When we include both
type of rate variables (∆Rate and the percentage rate difference) in the model, we obtained
similar results. Using the percentage rate difference instead of ∆Rate introduced a slight
bias into this variable’s coefficient estimation (in the positive direction), but this small bias
was not significant enough to change our interpretations of the results.
We included the V ehicleModelByMonth dummies to the indirect lender model to clear
the endogeneity in CustomerRate resulting from common demand shocks and Month dum-
mies to the online lender model to capture possible seasonal effects on the offered APR’s.
We also tried using different dummy variables (day-of-week, week, quarter, etc.). However,
we found no evidence of consistent seasonal effects on APR.
We note that, although Hausman-type instruments are commonly used in the literature,
they are not exempt from criticisms ([Breshanan, 1997]). As stated in [Petrin and Train,
2010], aggregate demographics such as average income, household size, etc. do not enter
the disaggregate models, but they affect market price. Therefore, they can serve as the
extra instruments that are needed for demand estimation. However, it is difficult to find
additional instruments in our case, since only the FICO score of each customer is available
among such demographics, and average FICO score for each pricing region and state do
not exhibit sufficient variation for the indirect and online lender customers, respectively.
Therefore, we rely on the results using R̂ate, which is a robust and efficient instrument and
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can possibly be used for similar customized pricing environments. In fact, verifying efficient
use of this instrument in other settings is a promising future research direction.
Table 3.10 shows the logistic regression coefficient estimation results for both on-line and
indirect base models. Using a logit model for the base models did not make a significant
difference in either the model fit statistics or the signs of the coefficients.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusions
We have applied a control function approach to estimate the value added through field
price discretion in an indirect auto lender relative to an on-line lender. We found that
price response for the indirect lender demonstrates significant endogeneity, while there is
little or no endogeneity in the price response data for the on-line lender. This leads us
to conclude that the observed endogeneity in the indirect channel is not intrinsic to auto
lending markets, such as that due to seasonality or common demand shocks, but must
be attributable to the different characteristics of indirect and on-line channels. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that the primary source of endogeneity for the indirect-lender
is the use of deal-specific local information by F&I managers.
We estimated that F&I managers increased profitability for the indirect lender by about
9% through the use of pricing discretion. This supports the hypothesis that field sales
staff can use local information to negotiate more profitable prices. However, we also show
that using the rates resulting from a centralized, data-driven profit maximization procedure
has the potential to significantly increase profitability and the combination of data-driven
centralized pricing with field price discretion provides the highest profits of all. We further
conclude that even though dealers play an important role in increasing profits in the status
quo pricing process, the profit increase is much smaller when field price discretion is used
in conjunction with the profit maximizing rates.
We note that correcting the estimates of customer price-elasticity for endogeneity sig-
nificantly increases the estimates for the indirect channel but has little effect on estimates
of elasticity for the on-line channel; correcting for endogeneity increased the price-elasticity
estimates by amounts ranging from 126% to 285% for the indirect lender. The magnitude of
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Explanatory On-line Indirect




Tier 4 -1.58∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
5 NA 0.08∗∗∗




Term Class 60 1.38∗∗∗ -1.14∗∗∗
≥66 2.87∗∗∗ -1.33∗∗∗
2 -3.64∗∗∗
Dealer ID : NA :
6103 -2.90∗∗∗
2 -0.04∗∗∗
Month : : NA
12 0.20∗∗∗
2
Vehicle Model By Month : NA :
1628 0.31∗∗∗
Vehicle Type Used 2.57∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗
Subvention Offer NO NA -2.73∗∗∗
F̂ ICO (/100) -0.54∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗
Log(Amount) -2.62∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
Prime Rate 6.44∗∗∗
Customer Cash ($1,000) NA 2.16∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 1 -153.6∗∗∗ -15.37∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 2 -105.38∗∗∗ -10.17∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 3 -80.41∗∗∗ -8.91∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 4 -72.24∗∗∗ -13.84∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 5 NA -8.27∗∗∗
Concordance 87.3% 87.1%
Log-likelihood -44,902 -889,465.4
Table 3.10: Base logit model coefficients
Significance Levels: ***: < 0.01; **: < 0.05; *: < 0.10
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this endogeneity correction in the indirect lending data is greater than the average changes
due to endogeneity correction reported for various list-pricing settings in [Bijmolt et al.,
2005]. They found that incorporating price endogeneity leads to an average increase of
50% in the estimated price elasticity. We attribute the higher levels that we found to the
effects of salesperson knowledge of individual deals. We also showed that even the corrected
price-elasticity estimates for the indirect lender are much lower than the ones estimated for
the on-line lender. This is consistent with the experience in other lending industries, which
has shown that on-line channels are typically more price-sensitive than indirect or direct
channels.
Indirect auto lending has the following characteristics that we believe make field price
discretion effective: There is face-to-face interaction during the sales process during which
a salesperson observes relevant characteristics of a customer that are not recorded in the
data and the salesperson is motivated to achieve a higher price for a transaction. While
our results are from the auto lending industry, we believe that they are applicable to mar-
kets with field price discretion that meet these characteristics. Such markets include most
lending and insurance markets (both consumer and business); real estate markets; group
sales in the travel industry; and a wide range of business-to-business industries such as
telecommunications, software services, and heavy and light machinery sales. It will be in-
teresting to note if local price discretion is equally effective in settings that do not share
these characteristics.
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Chapter 4
Estimating Willingness-to-Pay and
Reserve Price Distributions from
Negotiation Data
In this chapter, we consider customized pricing markets in which price is negotiable and in
which buyers differ in their willingnesses-to-pay (WTP) and sellers differ in the minimum
prices that they are willing to accept for the transaction (reservation or reserve prices).
Recall that, in these markets, the field sales force has some discretion to negotiate an indi-
vidual price for each transaction. The variation in sellers’ reservation prices can result from
different incentives and/or different levels of negotiation skills. We develop a methodology
based on the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm to estimate both the willingness-
to-pay and the reservation price distributions from transactions data. Although there is a
close relation between this methodology and the one developed in Chapter 3, they are in fact
developed using different model assumptions and the required data is not the same as well.
In particular, for the methodology developed in this chapter, the data include information
about both completed trades and failed trades, however we assume that price information
is only available for completed trades (which is the most common situation in these mar-
kets). Using the same indirect lender data from the auto lending industry, we show that
our approach provides improved estimates of customer price-sensitivity over benchmark ap-
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proaches commonly used in practice. We also show how the WTP and reservation price
estimates can be used to improve profits for the seller by optimally setting reservation prices
on negotiations. A counter-factual analysis shows that an increase in seller profits up to
7.1% can be achieved by giving the sales force appropriate reservation prices based on our
method.
4.1 Model Description
We start from the most basic case in which each product has only a product-specific value
to each seller and buyer. We are interested in estimating the parameters of the seller’s
reserve price and the buyer’s willingness-to-pay distributions. In case a trade takes place,
we assume that the symmetric Nash bargaining equilibrium is achieved, i.e., the final price is
the average of the buyer’s willingness-to-pay and the seller’s reserve price. When the trade
does not take place, we assume that we do not have any information except that the buyer’s
willingness-to-pay is less than the seller’s reserve price. This is equivalent to assuming an
efficient bargaining outcome. Modeling an imperfect bargaining situation would be far more
difficult and requires additional assumptions ([Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1983]).
Notation:
• R = reserve price of seller. We assume that R is a random variable distributed with
cdf Fr(r, θr) and pdf fr(r, θr), where θr denotes the distribution parameters.
• W = willingness-to-pay of buyer. We assume that W is a random variable distributed
with cdf Fw(w, θw) and pdf fw(w, θw), where θw denotes the distribution parameters.
• p = final price in case trade takes place.
• N = total number of negotiation outcomes.




and R ≤ p ≤W
If no trade takes place, then we only know that:
W < R
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We assume that the reserve price and willingness-to-pay distributions are independent of
each other and that each realization of these random variables is an independent sample
from the corresponding distributions. We discuss the implications of relaxing the former
assumption in Sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4.
4.1.1 Incomplete Data Problem
Let y represent the observed data (final prices and trade indicator). Also let
T = {i : trade takes place}
T = {i : no trade takes place}
Suppose that both the reserve price and willingness-to-pay are distributed normally with
θr = (µr, σr) and θw = (µw, σw), respectively. Hence θ = (µr, σr, µw, σw). In this case, the




ln {P (R+W = 2pi, R ≤ pi ≤W )}+
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i∈T
ln {P (W < R)}
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Detailed derivation of (4.1) can be found in Appendix C.1.
4.1.2 Complete Data Problem
In a complete data case where we can observe all the (Ri,Wi) pairs for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,




{ln fr(Ri, θr) + ln fw(Wi, θw)}
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Now, again suppose that both reserve price and willingness-to-pay value are distributed






















It is easy to maximize this function directly. In fact, from the well-known results for
(complete-data) maximum likelihood estimation for the normal distribution, the (complete-
























(Wi − µ̂w)2 (4.6)
4.1.3 The EM Method
Because the MLE function (4.1) is difficult to maximize directly, we use the Expectation-
Maximization (EM) approach introduced by [Dempster et al., 1977]. The EM method is
useful when the incomplete data log-likelihood function is difficult to maximize directly but
the complete data log-likelihood function has simple maximizers, as is the case in our model.
The textbook by [McLachlan and Krishnan, 1996] is a good resource for the details of the
method and its extensions. The EM method is used widely in the empirical Operations
Management literature in several applications such as choice-based revenue management
([Vulcano et al., 2010]) and demand estimation from censored sales ([Stefanescu, 2012]), for
substitutable products when the sales are lost in the event of a stock-out ([Anupindi et al.,
1998]), and under incomplete product availability ([Conlon and Mortimer, 2007]). Monte
Carlo implementations of the EM algorithm are also developed when the models result in
complex likelihood functions for the EM algorithm –see for example [Levine and Casella,
2001] and [Chan and Ledolter, 1995].
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The EM algorithm treats the actual data set as an ideal data set which records every
(Ri,Wi) pairs for i = 1, . . . , N and price information for each potential transaction, and
then works with the conditional expected value of this complete-data likelihood function.
In particular, it starts with initial estimates of the parameters and approaches the maxi-
mization of incomplete data log-likelihood function indirectly by proceeding iteratively in
terms of the complete data log-likelihood function. But, since complete data log-likelihood
function is unobservable, it is replaced by the conditional expectation of it, conditioned on
the observed data and the current estimates of the parameters ([McLachlan and Krishnan,
1996]).
The generalized EM algorithm improves the log-likelihood of the conditional expectation
of the complete data problem instead of maximizing it at every iteration. This algorithm
can be described as:
• Initialization: Set θ = θ(0)
On the (k + 1)th iteration:
• E-step: Calculate Q(θ, θ(k)) = Eθ(k) [Lc|y]
• M-step: Choose θ(k+1) such that
Q(θ(1), θ(0)) ≥ Q(θ, θ(0)) ∀θ ∈ Ω
We alternate E- and M-steps repeatedly until convergence.









w ) denotes the estimate of the parameter values θ after the kth EM























































(W − µw)2|W < R
]
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Therefore, the M-step on the (k+ 1)th iteration is implemented simply by replacing Ri, Wi,
(Ri − µ̂r)2 and (Wi − µ̂w)2 by their current conditional expectations in (4.3)-(4.6). Hence,
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These conditional expectations correspond to somewhat complicated integrals, which
can easily be computed using numerical expectation or Monte Carlo simulation methods.
The derivation of these integrals can be found in Appendix C.2.
We can relax the assumption that the reserve price (R) and willingness-to-pay value
(W ) are independent of each other. In this case, let (R,W ) be a bivariate random vector







where σrw = ρσrσw and ρ is the correlation coefficient. So, we now have five parameters to
estimate, i.e., θ = (µr, σr, µw, σw, ρ).
From the usual results for (complete-data) maximum likelihood estimation for the bi-







(Ri − µ̂r)(Wi − µ̂w)
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w , ρ(k)). By the same reasoning as in the independent case, the M-step
on the (k + 1)th iteration is implemented by replacing Ri, Wi, (Ri − µ̂r)2, (Wi − µ̂w)2 and

















w ), take the same form as (4.7)-(4.10) (considering the
correlated random variables) and σ̂
(k+1)















(R− µ̂(k)r )(W − µ̂(k)w )|W < R
]
The derivation of the integrals corresponding to these conditional expectations can be
found in Appendix C.3.
4.1.4 Accounting for Observable Buyer, Seller and Product Characteris-
tics
Assume that both the sellers’ reserve prices and the customers’ willingness-to-pay values
for a product are linear functions of the characteristics of the buyer and sellers, the product
characteristics, and a noise term with mean zero. This specification enables us to predict
specific sellers’ reserve price and specific buyers’ willingness-to-pay distributions for specific
products. Hence, we will be able to predict the probability of a trade taking place at
different prices, which enables us to determine optimal prices. We compare this method
with the more classical approach of fitting a probit regression model (which is corrected for
endogeneity) to the sales data.
We introduce the following additional notation:
• Zs = vector of seller characteristics
• Zb = vector of buyer characteristics
• W = vector of product characteristics
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Assume the following functional forms for R and W :
Ri = X
T
i βr + εi
Wi = Y
T
i βw + δi
where Xi = (Zs,W ), Yi = (Zb,W ). εi and δi, i = 1, . . . , N denote error terms which are
distributed with cdfs Fε and Fδ and pdfs fε and fδ, respectively. βr and βw are the vectors of
parameters for the corresponding functions. Let θr and θw denote the corresponding vectors
of parameters that we want to estimate. For now, we assume that the error terms, εi and
δi, i = 1, . . . , N , are independent of each other. We will consider the case of correlated error
terms at the end of this section.
In a complete data case where we can observe all the (Ri,Wi) pairs for all i = 1, . . . , N ,





ln fε(Ri −XTi βr, θr) + ln fδ(Wi − Y Ti βw, θw)
}
Now, suppose that εi and δi, i = 1, . . . , N are normally distributed random variables
with mean zero and variance σr and σw, respectively. Hence θ = (βr, σr, βw, σw) and






































(Wi − Y Ti βw)2
} (4.11)
In order to find the (complete-data) maximum likelihood estimators of the parameters,
θ̂, we need to maximize (4.11) with respect to θ = (βr, σr, βw, σw). Note that maximizing
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On the other hand, (4.12) is also equivalent to minimizing the linear least squares of the
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then, by the well-known results for linear regression, we know that (4.12) has a unique
solution, provided that the columns of X are linearly independent, which can be found by
solving the normal equations
(XTX)β̂r = X
TR (4.13)
Similarly, the (complete-data) MLE of βw, β̂w, can be found by solving the normal equations
(Y TY )β̂w = Y
TW (4.14)
where Y , βw and W are defined similarly.
From the usual results for (complete-data) maximum likelihood estimation for the nor-












(Wi − Y Ti β̂w)2 (4.16)
EM Method









w ) denotes the estimate of the parameter values θ after the kth EM
iteration. The current conditional expectation of the complete-data log likelihood is given
























































(W − Y Ti βw)2|W < R
]
Therefore, the M-step on the (k+ 1)th iteration is implemented simply by replacing Ri, Wi,
(Ri−XTi β̂r)2 and (Wi− Y Ti β̂w)2 by their current conditional expectations in (4.13)-(4.16).




w , are specified by solving the










Xi,jEθ(k) [R|R+W = 2pi, R ≤ pi] +
∑
i∈T











Yi,jEθ(k) [W |R+W = 2pi,W ≥ pi] +
∑
i∈T
Yi,jEθ(k) [W |W < R]
(4.18)













































The derivation of the integrals corresponding to these conditional expectations are in Ap-
pendix C.4.
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We can again relax the assumption that the error terms, εi and δi’s, are independent of
each other. In this case, let (ε, δ) be a bivariate random vector having a normal distribution







where σrw = ρσrσw and ρ is the correlation coefficient. So, we now have an additional
parameter to estimate, i.e., θ = (βr, σr, βw, σw, ρ).
From the usual results for (complete-data) maximum likelihood estimation for the bi-







(Ri −XTi β̂r)(Wi − Y Ti β̂w) (4.21)









w , ρ(k)). By the same reasoning as in the independent case, the M-step on
the (k+1)th iteration is implemented by replacing Ri, Wi, (Ri−XTi β̂r)2, (Wi−Y Ti β̂w)2 and
(Ri − XTi β̂r)(Wi − Y Ti β̂w) by their current conditional expectations. Therefore, (k + 1)th




w , are specified by solving the modified normal
equations given in (4.17)-(4.18) (but this time the random variables are correlated). (k+1)th




w and σrw take the same form as (4.19)-(4.20)















(R−XTi β̂(k)r )(W − Y Ti β̂(k)w )|W < R
]
The derivation of the integrals corresponding to these conditional expectations can be found
in Appendix C.5.
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4.2 Estimation
4.2.1 Synthetic Data
We first tested the performance of the proposed method using synthetic data. For this
purpose, we simulated buyers and sellers with WTP and reserve price values drawn from
distributions with known parameters. We then estimated the WTP and reserve price dis-
tribution parameters using the EM method. In order to speed up the procedure, we also
utilized Monte Carlo EM method, when necessary.
We drew both the willingness-to-pay and reserve price observations from normal dis-
tributions. In order to cover most of the trade percentage range and also to identify the
effects of the relative sizes of the mean and variance of WTP and reserve price distributions,
we fixed the mean and variance of the WTP distribution to 0 and 1, respectively, i.e., we
assume W ∼ N(0, 1), and used various levels for the mean and variance of the reserve price
distribution. Table 4.1 shows these different mean and standard deviation values for reserve
price distribution and the resulting trade probabilities.
Trade σr
Percentage 0.25 1 1.75
µr
-1 83% 76% 69%
-0.4 65% 61% 58%
0 50% 50% 50%
0.4 35% 39% 42%
1 17% 24% 31%
Table 4.1: Parameter values used in the synthetic data experiment
Another justification for using different levels of trade percentages is measuring the
effects of the amount of data on the computed estimates, i.e., if the trade percentage is
high, then we have more price data which should intuitively lead to better estimates. We
designed experiments using three different levels for the number of observations: 100, 1,000,
and 10,000 observations. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the true and estimated parameter values
for the levels of trade percentages shown in Table 4.1.
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We assumed Normal distributions with the given “true” parameters and we initiated
the algorithm using θ(0) = (0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1) as the initial parameter estimates. As the
convergence criterion, we required either the Euclidian distance of the parameter estimates
between two consecutive iterations to be less than 10−5 or the number of iterations exceed
1,000. Table 4.2 also reports the sample parameters for the “100 observations” case, since
for some cases, the sample parameters of the generated data sets are significantly different
than the theoretical “true” parameters (there were no such difference with 1,000 and 10,000
observations). As expected, the EM algorithm match the sample parameters more closely
than true parameters. We observed that the accuracy of the estimates increased significantly
with both more data and higher trade percentages within the same amount of data.
We also investigated the performance of the EM algorithm in case we account for observ-
able buyer, seller, and product characteristics. We constructed our examples by changing
their design in three different dimensions: We used 100, 1,000, and 10,000 observations,
two different trade percentage levels (around 40% and 80%), and three different numbers
of variables (2, 5, and 10). Therefore, we had 18 different examples.
We generated buyer and seller data whose mean WTP and reserve price values are
linear-in-parameters functions of known attributes and drew error values from Normal dis-
tributions with zero-mean and known standard deviations. For all of the examples, we
initiated the algorithm using 10 as the initial intercept value and 0 as the initial coefficient
estimates and we used the same convergence and stopping criteria as before. For 100 and
1,000 observations, the algorithm converged or stopped in a reasonable time, but for the
10,000 observation case we used the Monte Carlo EM algorithm to reduce the convergence
time (which was around 14 hours using 16GB of allocated RAM). Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6
provides the true and estimated parameters of the WTP and reserve price values for 100,
1,000, and 10,000 observations, respectively. Average mean squared errors between the true
and estimated parameters turned out to be 10.4991, 2.8293, and 0.4085 for 100, 1,000, and
10,000 observations, respectively.
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4.2.1.1 Robustness Checks
To assess the robustness of these results with respect to the underlying distribution assump-
tions, we generated synthetic data from different distributions with known parameters, and
applied the EM algorithm to estimate the WTP and reserve price distribution parameters,
assuming the data is distributed normally. Then we compared the estimated distribution
parameters’ predictive performance. In particular, we drew 1,000 WTP and reserve price
observations from normal, exponential, and logistic distributions, and, for each distribution
combination, estimated the WTP and reserve price distribution parameters assuming both
the WTP and reserve price are distributed normally. Hence, this experimental setup in-
cludes nine problem instances. To make the results more comparable, we fixed the mean
and standard deviation of the WTP to 100, and mean and standard deviation of the reserve
price to 50, i.e., we generated data from the following random variables: W1 ∼ N(100, 100),
W2 ∼ Exp(λ = 1/100) where λ is the rate parameter, and W3 ∼ Logistic(µ = 100, s =
100
√
(3)/π) where µ is the location and s is the scale parameter; similarly, R1 ∼ N(50, 50),
R2 ∼ Exp(λ = 1/50), and R3 ∼ Logistic(µ = 50, s = 50
√
(3)/π). We used the same
criteria for the stopping conditions of the EM algorithm. Table 4.7 presents the results of
this analysis.
In Table 4.7, µp and σp corresponds to the mean and standard deviation of the prices
realized among the 1,000 observations (for the deals where the trade occurs), the fifth column
shows the corresponding trade percentage among these 1,000 observations. µ̂p and σ̂p are
defined as µ̂p = E(p|W ≥ R) and σ̂p =
√
V ar(p|W ≥ R) and the last column corresponds to
the theoretical trade probabilities when R and W are both normally distributed with mean
and standard deviations are taken as the estimated parameters in columns 6-9. These results
suggest that, even though the magnitudes of the WTP and reserve price depend on the
underlying distributions, the predicted price distribution and trade probability predictions
are robust to different distributions.
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Trade Percentage










Table 4.8: EM algorithm robustness check 2a
In the second stage of this analysis, we analyzed the linear-in-parameters mean WTP
and reserve price case. We checked the robustness of the EM algorithm with respect to the
distributions of the error terms. To do this, we used the five-attribute model along with the
coefficients used in Tables 4.4 - 4.6 and generated 1,000 buyers and sellers for three different
cases (similar to previous analysis, we again used two different trade percentage levels for
each case): In the first case, we drew the error terms from normal distributions with 0-
mean and standard deviations of 8 and 15 for the WTP and reserve prices, respectively,
i.e., εi ∼ N(0, 8) and δi ∼ N(0, 15). For the second case, we drew the error terms from
logistic distributions with 0-mean and standard deviations of 8 and 15 for the WTP and
reserve prices, respectively, i.e., εi ∼ Logistic(0, 8
√
(3)/π) and δi ∼ Logistic(0, 15
√
(3)/π).
Finally, for the third case, we drew the error terms from gumbel distributions, again with
0-mean and standard deviations of 8 and 15 for the WTP and reserve prices, respectively,
i.e., εi ∼ gumbel(η = −γα, α = 8
√
(6)/π) and δi ∼ gumbel(η = −γα, α = 15
√
(6)/π)
where η is the location (mode) parameter, α is the (positive) scale parameter, γ is the Euler
constant (i.e., γ = 0.5772), and π = 3.1416. Hence, by varying the three error distributions
and two trade percentage levels, we obtained six problem instances.
For each problem instance, we estimated the relevant parameters using the EM method
assuming the errors are normally distributed with 0-mean. Then, in a test set consisting
1,000 buyers and sellers that we generated using the same procedures that we used to gener-
ate the training sets (i.e., same distribution assumptions for the error terms corresponding
CHAPTER 4. ESTIMATING WTP AND RESERVE PRICE 91
Low Trade Percentage
R βr,0 βr,1 βr,2 βr,3 βr,4 βr,5 σr
true prms 30 5 -0.1 -3 5 1 8
est. prms
error dist.
normal 35.00 6.56 -0.10 -2.18 4.86 0.46 8.29
logistic 26.56 6.1 -0.10 -2.05 4.92 1.25 7.07
gumbel 32.31 5.92 -0.10 -4.13 5.01 0.69 7.13
WTP βw,0 βw,1 βw,2 βw,3 βw,4 βw,5 σw
true prms 10 1.5 -0.05 2 4 3 15
est. prms
error dist.
normal 12.15 2.68 -0.05 2.61 4.04 2.90 12.06
logistic 8.26 1.08 -0.03 1.13 3.43 3.30 17.09
gumbel 3.47 1.26 -0.06 0.33 4.05 3.64 17.79
High Trade Percentage
R βr,0 βr,1 βr,2 βr,3 βr,4 βr,5 σr
true prms 30 5 -0.1 -3 3 1 8
est. prms
error dist.
logistic 34.85 6.19 -0.10 -4.38 2.88 0.43 8.81
gumbel 25.34 5.38 -0.10 -3.18 3.25 1.33 6.95
gumbel 22.18 5.31 -0.10 -2.59 3.09 1.35 3.75
WTP βw,0 βw,1 βw,2 βw,3 βw,4 βw,5 σw
true prms 10 1 -0.05 2 5 3 15
est. prms
error dist.
normal 8.78 3.20 -0.04 2.81 4.59 3.13 14.81
logistic 11.36 0.35 -0.06 1.98 5.05 2.87 14.36
gumbel 6.39 -0.52 -0.05 1.50 5.56 3.06 18.61
Table 4.9: EM algorithm robustness check 2b
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to the three cases explained above and the same two sets of attribute coefficients), we pre-
dicted the take-ups and compared them with the actual take-ups. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show
the prediction results along with the estimated coefficients for each problem instance. Rows
1-3-5 (2-4-6) in Table 4.8 correspond to the low (high) trade percentage case in Table 4.9.
The prediction errors and coefficient estimates do not change significantly when the error
terms are not distributed normally. Therefore, we conclude that the normal assumption is
not very restrictive and the EM method is robust to data with non-normal distributions.
4.2.1.2 Asymmetric Bargaining Powers
Until this point, we assumed that the status quo utilities (i.e. the utility obtained if one
decides not to bargain with the other player) of the seller and the customer are equal, so
that for cases where the trade takes place, the Nash bargaining solution is symmetric, i.e.,
R ≤W ⇒ p = 0.5R+ 0.5W
Now we relax this assumption and suppose that the seller and/or customer might have
systematically different status quo utilities, which can be interpreted as bargaining power.
In this case, if trade takes place at a price p, then we assume
p = αR+ (1− α)W for α ∈ (0, 1)
If α < 0.5, it can be interpreted as the sellers’ having systematically more bargaining power
than the customers, and vice versa. In particular, we analyze whether we can estimate α
from the data and we also look at the question of how important to take the true value of
α for the EM method.
By using the EM algorithm, we are actually scaling the mean of the WTP and reserve
price distributions to match the average price. α parameter determines the difference be-
tween the mean WTP and mean reserve price, i.e., it is an assumption that we make rather
than a statistic that needs to be estimated. In order to make this argument clearer, we
generated buyers and sellers with WTP and reserve price values drawn from distributions
with known parameters and calculated the final prices using different α values, ranging from
0.1 to 0.9 with an increment of 0.1, for the cases where trade takes place. Then, we applied
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α = 0.2 True Parameters
µr σr µw σw µp σp Trade Prob.
58 6 55 10 61.65 5.72 0.40
EM Parameter Estimations
α̂ µ̂r σ̂r µ̂w σ̂w LL* µ̂p σ̂p Trade Prob.
0.1 56.95 4.99 54.22 9.27 -6672.10 61.38 5.72 0.40
0.2 56.99 4.81 54.17 10.07 -6718.01 61.35 5.41 0.40
0.3 56.28 4.25 53.21 12.07 -6774.54 61.35 5.42 0.41
0.4 56.46 4.23 52.74 13.71 -6897.76 61.37 5.27 0.40
0.5 56.19 4.04 51.49 17.06 -7071.26 61.49 5.40 0.39
0.6 56.27 4.28 50.97 20.37 -7304.71 61.34 5.39 0.40
0.7 56.21 4.02 49.54 26.34 -7501.00 61.32 5.31 0.40
0.8 56.80 4.47 47.01 36.46 -7931.36 61.46 5.44 0.39
0.9 58.95 5.50 48.02 42.58 -8294.12 61.32 5.48 0.40
α = 0.5 True Parameters
µr σr µw σw µp σp Trade Prob.
58 5 55 10 59.17 4.44 0.40
EM Parameter Estimations
α̂ µ̂r σ̂r µ̂w σ̂w LL* µ̂p σ̂p Trade Prob.
0.1 57.63 6.46 55.22 6.44 -6565.73 58.99 4.71 0.40
0.2 56.55 5.10 54.14 7.67 -6503.83 59.04 4.53 0.40
0.3 55.55 4.33 52.81 9.57 -6561.17 59.03 4.54 0.40
0.4 55.29 4.08 52.31 11.14 -6654.65 59.02 4.49 0.40
0.5 55.79 4.31 52.53 12.13 -6794.94 58.98 4.32 0.40
0.6 55.48 4.22 51.42 15.31 -7006.49 58.91 4.42 0.40
0.7 55.61 4.20 50.62 19.26 -7230.15 58.95 4.46 0.40
0.8 55.44 3.98 47.98 28.48 -7568.02 58.97 4.53 0.40
0.9 57.57 4.88 49.80 30.40 -7837.32 59.01 4.69 0.40
α = 0.8 True Parameters
µr σr µw σw µp σp Trade Prob.
58 5 55 10 56.67 4.56 0.40
EM Parameter Estimations
α̂ µ̂r σ̂r µ̂w σ̂w LL* µ̂p σ̂p Trade Prob.
0.1 55.92 7.06 53.69 5.81 -6550.62 56.58 4.48 0.40
0.2 54.49 5.23 52.24 7.15 -6459.69 56.56 4.35 0.40
0.3 54.09 4.80 51.70 8.24 -6515.71 56.53 4.23 0.40
0.4 54.20 4.63 51.62 9.05 -6573.37 56.51 4.04 0.40
0.5 53.69 4.28 50.57 11.35 -6721.09 56.55 4.13 0.40
0.6 54.42 4.52 50.84 12.22 -6850.56 56.56 4.01 0.39
0.7 53.76 4.21 49.35 17.02 -7110.46 56.53 4.18 0.40
0.8 53.91 4.27 47.82 23.47 -7445.59 56.57 4.32 0.40
0.9 54.87 4.57 47.00 31.46 -7806.27 56.51 4.46 0.40
*LL: Log-Likelihood
Table 4.10: Asymmetric bargaining powers synthetic data experiment for 40% trade per-
centage
the EM algorithm using the same range of α values and try to capture the true value of
α by comparing the resulting likelihood values. We also calculated the mean and variance
of the final price distribution, conditioned on WTP being greater than reserve price, using
both the true and estimated parameters. Tables 4.10 and 4.11 show the results of these
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procedures.
α = 0.2 True Parameters
µr σr µw σw µp σp Trade Prob.
50 5 60 10 60.22 6.66 0.81
EM Parameter Estimations
α̂ µ̂r σ̂r µ̂w σ̂w LL* µ̂p σ̂p Trade Prob.
0.1 40.89 23.70 62.26 7.11 -7964.78 59.97 6.57 0.81
0.2 46.92 17.87 63.74 7.33 -7712.79 60.00 6.38 0.81
0.3 50.32 15.12 64.95 7.50 -7568.83 59.97 6.25 0.81
0.4 52.72 11.60 65.24 8.42 -7419.24 59.96 6.14 0.81
0.5 50.32 4.08 64.66 16.07 -7021.68 59.96 6.61 0.81
0.6 50.46 3.86 67.99 19.85 -7175.71 59.97 6.59 0.81
0.7 50.49 3.79 73.69 26.21 -7437.48 59.94 6.65 0.81
0.8 50.83 3.93 84.31 38.03 -7845.28 59.95 6.66 0.81
0.9 54.70 6.06 94.44 46.06 -8468.77 59.99 6.49 0.80
α = 0.5 True Parameters
µr σr µw σw µp σp Trade Prob.
50 5 60 10 56.09 4.76 0.81
EM Parameter Estimations
α̂ µ̂r σ̂r µ̂w σ̂w LL* µ̂p σ̂p Trade Prob.
0.1 36.59 25.08 58.56 4.90 -7648.84 55.81 4.79 0.81
0.2 43.81 18.05 59.93 4.70 -7278.44 55.84 4.67 0.81
0.3 48.88 11.12 59.53 5.36 -6925.84 55.86 4.52 0.81
0.4 50.65 8.00 59.43 6.27 -6753.32 55.85 4.43 0.81
0.5 50.26 5.06 59.50 9.20 -6679.13 55.82 4.52 0.81
0.6 50.29 4.53 61.32 11.71 -6808.68 55.84 4.60 0.81
0.7 50.52 4.34 64.25 15.29 -7032.34 55.85 4.69 0.81
0.8 50.88 4.29 69.73 21.24 -7351.11 55.83 4.75 0.81
0.9 51.97 4.47 81.56 33.66 -7850.62 55.87 4.78 0.81
α = 0.8 True Parameters
µr σr µw σw µp σp Trade Prob.
50 5 60 10 52.00 4.18 0.81
EM Parameter Estimations
α̂ µ̂r σ̂r µ̂w σ̂w LL* µ̂p σ̂p Trade Prob.
0.1 30.71 27.48 54.90 3.82 -7490.88 51.72 4.03 0.81
0.2 39.96 18.17 55.93 3.54 -7002.48 51.70 3.99 0.81
0.3 44.34 13.32 56.42 3.40 -6650.49 51.71 3.93 0.81
0.4 47.33 9.40 56.06 3.99 -6461.98 51.70 3.81 0.80
0.5 47.45 4.84 54.91 7.12 -6377.11 51.72 3.77 0.81
0.6 47.92 4.58 56.14 8.24 -6469.82 51.73 3.78 0.81
0.7 47.55 3.93 58.60 11.88 -6681.62 51.71 3.91 0.81
0.8 48.02 3.84 62.51 15.95 -6952.94 51.70 3.94 0.81
0.9 48.68 3.84 71.96 26.11 -7444.50 51.70 4.00 0.81
*LL: Log-Likelihood
Table 4.11: Asymmetric bargaining powers synthetic data experiment for 80% trade per-
centage
In Tables 4.10 and 4.11, α̂ corresponds to the assumed value of α which we used in the
EM algorithm. Also µ̂p = E(p|W ≥ R) and σ̂p =
√
V ar(p|W ≥ R) as before. For Table
4.10, the trade percentage is 40% and for Table 4.11, it is 80%. Clearly, using different
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α̂’s did not change the values of µ̂ and σ̂ significantly, which means that the EM algorithm
generates WTP and reserve price distribution parameters which best match the observed
distribution of the final prices, using the given α̂. Figure 4.1 shows that the distributions
of the final prices using different α̂’s (and corresponding estimated parameters) and using
the true value of α (with the true distribution parameters) are very close to each other.
We also note that, when we use different α̂’s, the resulting estimated trade probabilities are
very close to each other, hence, true α values did not play a role in the trade percentage
estimates either.
























Figure 4.1: Final price distributions using true and assumed α values
The log-likelihood values calculated using the estimated parameters did not help identi-
fying the true value of α either, since the parameters that give the maximum log-likelihood
values are not the ones estimated using the true value of α. Therefore, identifying the true
value of α from the data is not feasible. However, we can still make insightful observations
from this experiment. The value of α̂ that gives the maximum log-likelihood values is in-
creasing in the trade ratio, i.e., if the trade percentage in the data is low then lower α̂ values
give better log-likelihoods. This can be interpreted as follows: When sellers are less willing
to deviate from their targets of achieving a final price as close to the customers’ WTP as
CHAPTER 4. ESTIMATING WTP AND RESERVE PRICE 96
possible, the final prices turn out to be closer to the customer’s WTP values (hence lower
α) but the trade percentage decreases. On the other hand, when they are desperate to sell
their products, then the final prices turn out to be closer to the their reserve price values
(hence higher α) and the trade percentage increases.
4.2.2 Real Data from Auto Lending Industry
In this section, we explain the way we applied the EM method to a real data set and present
the insights coming from this experiment. We applied the EM technique to a unique data
set coming from an auto lending company which is a major auto manufacturer and lender
operating in the United States. This is the same data set used in Chapter 3 to quantify the
value of the field price discretion in a specific organization. Recall that this company uses its
dealers who are spread across the country to interact with its end customers. Although there
is a centralized list price optimization system which provides the dealers a price (interest
rate of the loan) for the each specific loan, the dealer has discretion to change or adjust
the final price. Hence, the final rate is determined after a negotiation between the dealer
and customer. More detailed explanation about this data set and the underlying lending
process can be found in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
This data set contains the final rate information even for those potential customers who
ended up not taking the loan. Hence we were able to compare the estimation accuracy of the
EM method not only with the currently used (benchmark) methods but also with the true
values of the estimated variables. To do this, we pretended that there is no customer rate
information for lost sales, and estimated take-up, price-sensitivities, and rates in a holdout
sample using only the remaining “observed” data. We estimated these variables using both
the EM method and the benchmark method, and compared the results both with each other
and with the true values of the variables, when applicable. We next describe the details of
the current industry practice, which we used as a benchmark method.
4.2.2.1 Benchmark Method
In customized pricing environments, it is common that there is no price information for the
lost transactions. There are several techniques for the imputation of these missing values
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([Greenlees et al., 1982], [Erdem et al., 1999], [Qian and Xie, 2011]). These methods have
been used in areas such as labor economics (estimate industry/occupational choice models
when only accepted wages are observed –[Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985], [Keane et al., 1988])
and housing or real estate (estimation when only the sold house prices are available –[Case
and Quigley, 1991], [Quigley, 1995]). In this study, we use the regression imputation as our
benchmark method.
In the regression imputation method, the final price for failed negotiations are imputed
using the prices recorded for successful transactions by applying linear regression to the
prices from successful negotiations. After this imputation, some type of Bernoulli regression
(logit, probit, etc.) is applied using these imputed prices along with the customer, seller,
and product characteristics as explanatory variables to predict take-up, final price and
customer price sensitivities ([Boyd et al., 2005], [Phillips, 2005; Phillips, 2012a], [Agrawal
and Ferguson, 2007]). We selected the probit model since it assumes that the error term is
normally distributed with zero mean (the variance of the error term is fixed as one, which
is different than our model and affects the scaling of the parameter estimations), so it is
more comparable with our EM estimations than the logistic model. However, we tried using
logistic regression for predicting “lost customer” rates and take-up as well, and obtained
similar results.
There are number of drawbacks with the regression imputation method. First of all,
using the Bernoulli regression in a straightforward way is problematic by itself because the
price is an endogenous variable, since there are some unrecorded transaction characteristics
which could effect the pricing process but cannot be controlled in the regression models.
This effect was discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
Secondly, the regression imputation method does not estimate the seller price sensitiv-
ities. This information could be useful for companies that use list pricing with discretion.
Knowing how much their dealers are willing to adjust the list price for each type of customers
would certainly help such companies in their price optimization procedures.
Thirdly, the regression imputation does not take the underlying negotiation process into
account. Both parties agree on a price after negotiations, and this implies that the final price
is a lower-bound for the WTP of the customer and an upper-bound for the reserve price of
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the seller. Hence, this should also be taken into account when estimating the customers’
and sellers’ WTP and reserve price distributions.
Finally, this method suffers from a severe underestimation bias introduced to the im-
puted prices. If a seller’s reserve price for a specific product is high, then we are less likely
to observe it in the collected data set. This is due to the fact that it is less likely that this
transaction will actually take place and it creates a significant selection bias. The negative
effects of the selection bias in the imputation methods are pointed out in the literature and
tried to be mitigated in several studies such as [Greenlees et al., 1982].
4.2.2.2 Results
We randomly selected (without replacement) a sample that consists of 200,000 observed
negotiation outcomes from the original data which corresponds to 9.35% of the entire data
set, since using the entire data set is computationally expensive and using a subset of
the data set is sufficient for our comparison purposes. Throughout these experiments, we
assumed a symmetric bargaining setting (α = 0.5).
We used the base price-response model used in Chapter 3 with some changes. In par-
ticular, we did not include two categorical variables that have vast amount of categories
(V ehicleModelByMonth variable has 1628, DealerID variable has 6103 categories), since
including these variables in the base price-response model is only appropriate when the
entire data set is used. Details of the variable definitions and the variable selection process
can be found in Section 3.2.1.
We randomly split the data set into an estimation and holdout sample with a sample
size ratio of 1:1. We estimated the parameters of both models, EM and Benchmark, using
the estimation sample, and then tested the prediction performance of estimated models
using the holdout sample. Table 4.12 shows the variables that were used in estimation
and the corresponding coefficient estimates for the WTP and reserve price values, including
the standard deviation estimates of the unobserved shocks. For real data experiments,
we assumed that the unobserved shocks to WTP and reserve price values are uncorrelated,
though the results do not change significantly if we estimate assuming correlated error terms.
This implies that the correlation between WTP and reserve price values is mostly captured
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by the product, seller, and buyer characteristics embedded in the liner-in-parameters mean
functions, hence the unobserved component of these values were not significantly correlated.
Coefficient estimations of the benchmark probit model and the probit model using the
true lost customer rates are also presented in Table 4.12. In the last column of Table 4.12,
we estimate similar coefficient values with the models presented in Chapter 3 even though
two categorical variables are not used, as explained above. More detailed explanation and
the intuition behind these coefficient estimates can be found in Section 3.2.1.
The third column, titled Benchmark Probit Coefficient Estimations in Table 4.12, shows
a similar model using the imputed rates instead of the actual rates for the lost sales. The
signs and magnitudes of the coefficient estimates and the statistical significance of the
variables are similar for these two models, except for the ∆Rate variables for each risk tier.
This difference is due to the selection bias explained in the previous section, i.e., the imputed
lost rates are underestimated which leads to underestimation of the price sensitivities of the
customers.
Indeed, the benchmark method predicted the mean rate for lost transactions as 5.87%
in the holdout sample (Table 4.13), even though its true value is 6.69% (mean rate for won
customers is 4.92%). The EM method, on the other hand, predicted this value as 6.60%
which is much closer to its true value.
Most EM parameter estimates for the WTP and reserve price values are also consistent
with the estimations of the benchmark model and the probit model using the true lost
customer rates. We note that, since we are modeling the “accept” probability in both
probit models, the sign of the βw − βr should be consistent with these probit models. This
holds for all variables (with the exception of “Tier 3”), which provides a sanity check.
Table 4.13 shows the results for the incorrect take-up prediction for the holdout sample
as well. The benchmark method predicted the take-up incorrectly for 25.08% of the ob-
servations in the holdout sample. This number goes down slightly to 24.77% when we use
the EM method. We observed similar slight improvements in synthetic data experiments
and other samples of the indirect lender data as well. It is also worth mentioning that,
in case where we can use the true lost customer rates, the prediction performance of the
probit model significantly increases –it was 22.55% for this holdout sample. We did not
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EM Benchmark Probit Probit Using “True”
βr βw Coefficient Estimations Customer Rates
Intercept 27.95 17.59 -1.65∗∗∗ -0.86∗∗∗
Tier2 1.02 0.65 -0.16∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
Tier3 1.82 1.88 0.05∗∗* -0.05∗∗*
Tier4 3.55 3.04 0.12∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
Tier5 5.43 4.66 -0.11∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗*
Term Class 2 2.03 0.36 -0.33∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗
Term Class 3 2.41 -0.12 -0.48∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗
Term Class 4 3.82 0.27 -0.68∗∗∗ -0.60∗∗∗
Used -0.39 4.87 1.09∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗
Subvention -9.33 -0.68 1.64∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗
FICOhat -0.27 -0.88 -0.13∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
Log Amount -2.08 -1.40 0.11∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
Cash Incentive -0.67 3.65 0.82∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗
Prime Rate 0.34 0.11 -39.54∗∗∗ -32.57∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 1 -2.67∗∗∗ -8.12∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 2 -0.67∗∗∗ -5.48∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 3 NA -2.62∗∗∗ -4.99∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 4 -4.79∗∗∗ -8.02∗∗∗
∆Rate for Tier 5 -1.84∗** -6.03∗∗∗
σ 4.24 2.63 1.00 1.00
Log-Likelihood (for holdout) -46,734.6 -46,617.3 -45,827.1
Table 4.12: Coefficient estimation results using the EM algorithm and benchmarks.
Significance Levels: ***: < 0.01; **: < 0.05; *: < 0.10
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use the endogeneity corrected probit model (with true lost customer rates) to compare the
prediction performance, since an uncorrected model can often give better predictions than
a corrected model ([Ebbes et al., 2011]).
Using true “lost”
True Value customer rates Benchmark EM
Incorrect Take-up Prediction NA 22.55% 25.08% 24.77%
Predicted Mean “Lost” Customer Rate 6.69% NA 5.87% 6.60%
Table 4.13: EM algorithm prediction performance 1
Using the estimated EM model in Table 4.12 we predicted the WTP and reserve price
values for each customer in the holdout sample. Table 4.14 presents the mean of these
results for each risk tier, together with the mean predicted rate and trade probabilities
(calculated using the reported means and estimated common standard deviations of R and
W ). True values of these variables are also shown in Table 4.14. Average predicted rates are
very close to their true values for each tier. The take-up probabilities are also close to the
realized take-up rates although they are slightly overestimated –this overestimation is more
significant for less risky customers. Overall, we have a consistent and intuitive ranking of
the mean rates and take-up rates in the sense that more risky customers have higher mean
rates and less risky customers are more likely to accept the loan (due to lower rates and
more available sales incentives) both in the predicted model and in the data.
N avg R avg W avg rate P (W > R) true avg rate true take-up rate
Tier 1 48,569 1.40% 7.36% 4.13% 88.37% 4.14% 78.49%
Tier 2 19,941 4.52% 7.17% 5.30% 70.22% 5.46% 63.85%
Tier 3 17,809 5.77% 7.96% 6.26% 66.95% 6.42% 62.57%
Tier 4 5,148 7.15% 8.61% 7.19% 61.50% 7.88% 59.11%
Tier 5 7,384 9.04% 9.81% 8.64% 56.13% 9.77% 54.78%
Table 4.14: EM algorithm prediction performance 2
The WTP and reserve price values have a consistent ranking as well, in the sense that
the reserve price of the sellers are higher for more risky customers and, consistently, more
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risky customers are willing to pay higher rates. The only exception to this ranking is
the mean predicted WTP of Tier 2 customers which is lower than the one estimated for
Tier 1 customers. However, this odd ranking is not an estimation inconsistency (intercept
adjustment for Tier 2 is indeed higher than Tier 1), but is an implication of the fact that
customers are willing to pay a significantly higher rate for the used vehicles (4.87% higher
on average) and 30% of the Tier 2 customers are being financed for a used vehicle. This
ratio goes down to 10% for the Tier 1 customers which causes the average WTP of Tier 2
customers being higher than Tier 1 customers.
We estimated the customer price elasticities for the representatives of each customer
type (using the average rate over all customers, which is 5.72%, and most common levels of
the categorical variables1) and the seller price elasticities for a representative seller against
each customer type (using the same values of the variables). Table 4.15 shows the customer
and seller price elasticity estimations for each risk tier using different methods. The first
column corresponds to the estimation using the price-response model with the true lost
customer rates. These values are severely biased towards zero because of the endogeneity
problem. We present a method to handle this problem in Chapter 3 and –using this method–
reported the endogeneity corrected price elasticity estimates. We present those estimations
in the second column of Table 4.15 for completeness. These estimates are more reasonable
when we consider the auto lending industry standards.
The third column of Table 4.15 shows the customer price elasticity estimations from
the benchmark method. These estimations are even more biased towards zero, due to the
additional selection bias as explained before. We also note that for both the first and third
columns there is no consistent ranking in the price elasticities. In general, riskier customers
tend to be less price-elastic and have higher overall take-up rates ([Phillips and Raffard,
2011]). Although we do not observe higher take up rates for riskier customers in the data,
we observe that riskier customers are less price-elastic in the endogeneity corrected elasticity
estimations.
1One exception to that is we used non-subvened level of “Subvention Offer” variable, since the mean rate
that we used was more consistent with a non-subvened offer. This is consistent with the price elasticity
calculations used in Chapter 3
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We used two different levels of variables to report the price elasticities of customers
and sellers using the EM method. For the estimations titled Method 1, we used the same
values of the variables that are used for the benchmark methods (rate: 5.72%, etc.). For the
estimations titled Method 2, we used predicted values of the mean WTP and reserve price
to calculate the price elasticities for each risk tier (these values are reported in Table 4.14).
We note that the differences in the estimations of these methods is due to the fact that while
we use the most common levels of the variables (among the entire data set) for the first
method, we use the average of these variable values (average of the observations in this data
sample) for the second method. We further note that customer price elasticities calculated
using the EM method do not manifest a bias towards zero when we compare them with the
endogeneity corrected price elasticities calculated in Chapter 3. This indicates that the EM
method successfully handles the price endogeneity problem by explicitly endogenizing the
price setting process, instead of taking it as an exogenous input to the model2. Therefore,
this method can be used as an alternative to the various two-stage instrumental variable
methods, which could be even more helpful for the cases where it is hard to come up with
good instruments, as is the case in many customized pricing environments.
Similar to the customer price elasticity, seller price elasticity is defined as the percentage
increase in the amount of sellers whose reserve prices are less than a specified price when
that price is increased by 1%. Seller price elasticities are intuitively estimated as positive.
And the ranking of the tiers suggests that sellers are more price-sensitive for the more risky
customers. This is again intuitive, since the sellers need to be more careful while lending
to the customers with higher default risks.
We performed a similar analysis after splitting the data into two equal parts based on the
offer time of the transactions, i.e., we used the first half of the entire period as the estimation
sample and the second half as the holdout sample. The idea behind this separation is testing
the performance of the EM and benchmark methods in variable environments. Table 4.16
2Also realize that price elasticity of Tier 2 customers turns out to be higher than Tier 1 customers,
because the predicted mean WTP of Tier 2 customers is lower than Tier 1 customers as explained before
and we use a common standard deviation of the WTP distributions for each risk tier (i.e., ranking of price
elasticities and the predicted mean WTP needs to be the same, due to our modelling assumptions).
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presents the results of this test. In this case, the EM method still performs slightly better
than the benchmark in predicting take-up, but its performance in predicting the rates for the
lost deals is not as good. Since the pricing environment changed over time, the prediction
performance of the model with the true lost customer rates is not significantly better than
the other methods for this experiment.
Using true “lost”
True Value customer rates Benchmark EM
Incorrect Take-up Prediction NA 25.16% 25.34% 25.27%
Predicted Mean “Lost” Customer Rate 6.06% NA 5.29% 7.12%
Table 4.16: EM algorithm prediction performance for variable environments
4.3 Centralized Minimum Price Policy
WTP and reserve price distribution estimations can be used to improve the revenue. In
cases where there are no dealers involved in the process, the classical problem of revenue




where F̄w(p) is the willingness-to-pay distribution of the customers. However, in cases
where there is a centralized seller who delegates pricing decisions to local sales force, the
problem differs in the sense that the seller should also take the local sales force’s reserve
price into consideration. In fact, we show in Chapter 3 that field price discretion of the
dealers improve profits using the same auto lending data set used in this chapter. Here,
we are analyzing the question of how does the unlimited local pricing discretion affect the
profits? As a matter of fact, some companies are lively discussing the issue of imposing
price ranges on their local sales force.
In a bargaining model with full information, [Roth et al., 2006] show that setting a
credible commitment to a reservation price yields higher profits. They discuss three reasons,
which are also relevant to our study. First, the more bargaining power of sellers, the better
they can price discriminate and extract the consumer surplus. However, committing to a
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reservation price guarantees a minimum revenue that is at least as high as the posted-price
revenue, independent of the bargaining power. Secondly, committing to a reservation price
keeps some customers from purchasing the product that they would have bought otherwise.
Thirdly, setting a higher reservation price guarantees the seller a higher minimum revenue
from each customer who actually does buy the service. The latter two forces correspond to
“Case 1” and “Case 2” in Figure 4.2, respectively. [Roth et al., 2006] also state that “...the
mere announcement not to sell below the reservation price is not credible”, since the seller
has an incentive to sell to a customer whose willingness-to-pay is lower than the reservation
price but higher than the marginal cost of the product. In our scenario, the minimum price
policy is assumed to be imposed on the dealers by the lender and the violaters of this policy
will be imposed sanctions, so the commitment of the dealers is credible.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical study to justify the use of price
ranges or commitment to a minimum reservation price policy. To analyze this situation,
we characterize the expected revenue from a transaction and then maximize it with respect
to a minimum price policy. Note that, imposing a maximum price for a transaction would
always decrease the profits since, in this case, if the equilibrium price (peq) turns out to be
higher than the maximum price, then this transaction will not occur even if it would be
profitable.
In the symmetric Nash bargaining setting described in the previous sections, the ex-








We assume that the following policy is imposed to dealers for a specific product:
Minimum Price Policy (MPP): The price of the product cannot be less than pmin
We need to derive the optimal pmin that will maximize the expected revenue. We note
that there are four possibilities given W ≥ R:
• Case 1: R ≤W ≤ pmin. In this case no trade will occur.
• Case 2: R ≤ peq ≤ pmin ≤W . Trade will occur at pmin
• Case 3: R ≤ pmin ≤ peq ≤W . Trade will occur at peq
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• Case 4: pmin ≤ R ≤W . Trade will occur at peq
For Case 3 and Case 4 the expected revenue does not change while it will increase for Case







Case 1 Case 2 
Case 3 
Case 4 
Figure 4.2: Revenue change zones based on the value or R and W
The expected revenue from a transaction under MPP can be written as
E(RevenueMPP ) = 0 ∗P(R ≤W ≤ pmin)








|pmin ≤ R ≤W )P(pmin ≤ R ≤W )
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With a little bit of algebra, we can write this expression as






































Fr(2pmin − x)fw(x)dx− pminfw(pmin)Fr(pmin)
Proposition 6: If Fr and Fw have support only on (0,∞) and if fw is non-increasing in












Fr(x)fw(2pmin − x)dx− pminfw(pmin)Fr(pmin)
By the Mean Value Theorem for Integrals, there must be some p̂ ∈ (0, pmin) such that:∫ pmin
0




= pmin [Fr(p̂)fw(2pmin − p̂)− fw(pmin)Fr(pmin)]
Since Fr(p̂) ≤ Fr(pmin) and fw(2pmin− p̂) ≤ fw(pmin), the partial derivative is less than or
equal to 0. Q.E.D.
Corollary 1: If W is distributed exponentially, then p∗min = 0. If R ∼ Uniform(ar, br)
and W ∼ Uniform(aw, bw) with some ar, aw ≥ 0, then:
• If aw ≤ ar, then p∗min = 0
• If aw > ar, then p∗min = aw
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Proof The first part follows immediately from Proposition 6. The second part follows since
in case aw > ar, if pmin > aw, then
∂E(RevenueMPP )
∂pmin
≤ 0 by Proposition 6 and if pmin < aw
then ∂E(RevenueMPP )∂pmin =
∫ pmin
0 Fr(x)fw(2pmin− x)dx ≥ 0 and non-decreasing (zero if pmin <
aw
2 and increasing if
aw
2 ≤ pmin ≤ aw) in pmin. Finally, in case aw ≤ ar, if pmin > aw, then
∂E(RevenueMPP )
∂pmin
≤ 0 by Proposition 6 and if pmin < aw then ∂E(RevenueMPP )∂pmin = 0. Q.E.D.
Although there is no closed-form solution for p∗min when R and W are both normally
distributed, it can be easily calculated numerically. Figure 4.3 shows the graph of (4.22)
where we assume that R and W are normally distributed and plug in the estimated param-
eters of R and W for each risk tier of the indirect lender data (mean R and W values are
given in Table 4.14). Figure 4.3 shows that the expected revenue from each transaction can
be increased significantly by imposing an MPP. The increase is more significant for Tier 1
customers. The reason for this difference can be seen in Figure 4.2. The dealer’s reserve
prices for Tier 1 customers are lower than the other tiers, so the distributions of R and W
coincide more with the region labeled as ”Case 2” in Figure 4.2, which is the region where
the expected revenue increases under MPP.
We can also calculate a distinct minimum price for each product/customer combination
and impose it on the dealers to increase the profit. We applied this method to the sample
used in the estimation process of previous section. We first clustered the transaction based
on their loan amounts (we used 6 clusters) and then for each Tier / Term / Vehicle Type /
Subvention Eligibility / Amount Cluster combination (there were 316 such combinations)
we calculated the mean F̂ ICO, Cash Incentive, and Prime Rate values. After plugging these
mean values for each combination into the estimated model, we calculated the mean R and
W values and numerically found the optimal pmin values for each combination. Finally, we
calculated the total profits that would have been obtained from the same set of customers if
these minimum prices had imposed for each transaction. It turns out that the total profits
could be increased by 7.1% by imposing MPP with optimal minimum prices. We can also
use a fixed optimal minimum price for each risk tier without considering other attributes.
In this case, we calculated the mean R and W values and numerically found the optimal
pmin values for each risk tier. This time the profit increase was only 2.4%. The difference
comes from a more thorough price optimization performed in the previous case.
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Figure 2: Expected Revenue vs. Minimum Price for each Tier 
Figure 4.3: Expected revenue as a function of Minimum Price (pmin) for each tier
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4.4 Discussion and Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed a new structural estimation method based on the EM algo-
rithm. This method enables us to predict WTP and reserve price distributions for new
product / customer-type / seller-type combinations. It also enables us to estimate seller
price sensitivity which could not be estimated using the traditional estimation methods,
but at the same time, is important for firms that have a centralized pricing optimization
system but work with regional sales staff or other type of intermediaries to interact with
the end customers.
Using this method, we bring structure to brute-force prediction of take-up and final price
by taking the negotiation process into account. This enables us to model the underlying
process more realistically and hence leads to better prediction performance. The method
also handles the price endogeneity problem by endogenizing the final price into model rather
than assuming that it is an output of an exogenous process. In this way, we obtain more
consistent customer price sensitivity estimates.
We also performed various numerical analyses to support our hypothesis empirically.
The ones using synthetic data showed that proposed method successfully uncovers the
WTP and reserve price distribution parameters of the customers and sellers, respectively.
And the ones with the real data showed that the proposed method strongly outperforms
the benchmark method in predicting the final price for lost customers, which is the hard
part of the problem since we do not completely observe the pricing/negotiation process for
lost sales. This method slightly improves the prediction of take-up as well.
Finally, a counter-factual analysis based on a real-world data set of auto loans showed
that an increase in seller profits up to 7.1% can be achieved by giving the sales force
appropriate reserve prices based on our WTP and reserve price distribution estimates.
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Linear Exponential Linear Exponential
Network Product a b a b Network Product a b a b
1
1 100 2 4.61 2
3
16 128 4 5.02 4
2 95 2 4.59 2 17 138 5 5 5
3 110 2 4.62 2 18 150 5 4.97 5
4 105 2 4.6 2 19 130 4 4.98 4
5 140 4 5.01 4 20 130 4 4.99 3
6 150 4 5 4 21 145 5 5.05 5
7 130 4 4.98 4
4
1 100 3 4.61 3
8 80 1 4.41 1 2 110 3 4.59 3
9 85 1 4.4 1 3 105 2 4.62 2
10 120 3 4.8 3 4 95 2 4.6 2
2
1 100 2 4.61 2 5 90 3 4.61 3
2 95 2 4.59 2 6 100 3 4.58 3
3 110 2 4.62 2 7 105 2 4.6 2
4 105 2 4.6 2 8 150 5 4.99 5
5 140 4 5.01 4 9 130 4 5 4
6 150 4 5 4 10 145 5 5.04 5
7 130 4 4.98 4 11 154 5 5.02 5
8 145 4 4.99 4 12 148 4 5 4
9 85 1 4.4 1 13 140 5 4.97 5
10 75 1 4.41 1 14 125 4 4.98 4
3
1 100 3 4.61 3 15 150 5 4.99 5
2 110 3 4.59 3 16 130 4 5.02 4
3 105 2 4.62 2 17 145 5 5 5
4 95 2 4.6 2 18 154 5 4.97 5
5 90 3 4.61 3 19 148 4 4.98 4
6 100 3 4.58 3 20 72 1 4.38 1
7 140 4 4.98 2 21 82 2 4.4 2
8 150 5 4.99 5 22 76 3 4.37 3
9 130 4 5 4 23 75 2 4.38 2
10 145 5 5.04 5 24 80 2 4.4 2
11 154 5 5.02 5 25 84 1 4.37 1
12 148 4 5 4 26 77 1 4.42 1
13 135 4 4.97 5 27 88 2 4.41 2
14 140 4 4.98 4 28 80 2 4.4 2
15 126 5 4.99 5
Table A.1: Demand function parameters used in Section 2.5: Numerical Analysis
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Capacity
Constrained Centralized Constrained Decentralized
Network Resource Linear Exponential Linear Exponential
1
1 280 150 180 70
2 280 150 180 70
3 280 150 180 70
4 280 150 180 70
2
1 220 170 180 70
2 250 170 200 70
3 220 170 180 70
4 220 170 180 70
3
1 390 200 278 100
2 390 200 278 100
3 390 200 278 100
4 390 200 278 100
5 390 200 278 100
6 390 200 278 100
4
1 380 200 255 100
2 380 200 255 100
3 380 200 255 100
4 600 400 350 100
5 380 200 255 100
6 380 200 255 100
7 380 200 255 100
Table A.2: Capacity levels used in Section 2.5: Numerical Analysis
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3:
Endogeneity Correction Literature
Review
Several theoretical tests for endogeneity in models of limited dependent variables have been
developed by, among others, [Heckman, 1978], [Newey, 1985; Newey, 1987], and [Rivers and
Vuong, 1988]. [Kuksov and Villas-Boas, 2008] and [Kim and Petrin, 2012] also describe
methods of testing for endogeneity. [Louviere et al., 2005] survey various manifestations of
endogeneity in marketing contexts and the implications for estimation.
[Berry et al., 1995] developed the most widely used approach to endogeneity correction
in price-sensitivity estimation –known as BLP method– when only market-level data is ob-
served. As noted in [Louviere et al., 2005], the BLP approach moves the endogeneity out
of nonlinear choice models into linear regressions by appealing to the aggregate demand
equations as a source of information on the unobserved demand factor, allowing standard
instrumental variables methods to be used. BLP procedures are applicable when endogene-
ity arises over groups of decision-makers, e.g., when price is set separately in geographical
markets where each has many consumers, and price and unrecorded attributes vary only
across these markets but are the same for all customers in the same market. This method
is later extended to include also consumer-level data ([Berry et al., 2004]).
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We use a control function approach to detect and correct for endogeneity that was first
applied to simultaneous binary probit models by [Rivers and Vuong, 1988]. [Blundell and
Powell, 2004] include the control function approach in their discussion of semiparametric
methods for binary choice and [Petrin and Train, 2010] claim that control function approach
is easier to estimate and applicable to more general situations than the BLP approach.
Other methods of accounting for endogeneity in choice models have also been proposed.
[Villas-Boas and Winer, 1999] and [Gupta and Park, 2009] have developed a maximum like-
lihood approaches, and [Yang et al., 2003] and [Jiang et al., 2009] have developed Bayesian
methods for handling endogeneity. [Crawford, 2000], [Nevo, 2001], [Goolsbee and Petrin,
2004] and [Chintagunta et al., 2005] study the magnitude of endogeneity in price-sensitivity
estimation for a variety of products offered at list prices.
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Appendix to Chapter 4: Algebraic
Derivations




ln {P (R+W = 2pi, R ≤ p ≤W )}+
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i∈T
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C.2 Basic Model Specification

















−∞ xfr(x)fw(2p− x)dx∫ p
−∞ fr(x)fw(2p− x)dx
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Therefore,









Along similar lines, we obtain a similar expression for Eθ [Wi|Ri +Wi = 2p,Wi ≥ p]:


























Next, we derive the expectations conditioned on the event that no trade takes place:
Eθ [Ri|Wi < Ri] =
∫ ∞
−∞
xf(r|w<r)(x)dx where f(r|w<r)(x) =
fr(x)Fw(x)











P (W < R)
and
Eθ [Wi|Wi < Ri] =
∫ ∞
−∞
xf(w|w<r)(x)dx where f(w|w<r)(x) =
fw(x)[1− Fr(x)]




P (W < R)
We derive the conditional second central moments as follows. First conditioned on the
event that trade takes place:
Eθ
[




R2i |Ri +Wi = 2p,Ri ≤ p
]
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Eθ
[




W 2i |Ri +Wi = 2p,Wi ≥ p
]











and -finally- conditioned on the event that no trade takes place:
Eθ
[




R2i |Wi < Ri
]

















W 2i |Wi < Ri
]









P (W < R)
+ µ2w
C.3 Basic Model with Correlated R and W





fr,w(x, 2p− x)∫ p






fr,w(x, 2p− x)∫ p




−∞ xfr,w(x, 2p− x)dx∫ p
−∞ fr,w(x, 2p− x)dx
where fr,w(x, y) is the joint pdf of (R,W ). Similarly,
Eθ [Wi|Ri +Wi = 2p,Wi ≥ p] =
∫∞
p xfr,w(2p− x, x)dx∫∞
p fr,w(2p− x, x)dx
Next, we derive the expectations conditioned on the event that no trade takes place:
Eθ [Ri|Wi < Ri] =
∫ ∞
−∞
xf(r|w<r)(x)dx where f(r|w<r)(x) =
∫ x
−∞ fr,w(x, y)dy






















P (W < R)
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and
Eθ [Wi|Wi < Ri] =
∫ ∞
−∞
xf(w|w<r)(x)dx where f(w|w<r)(x) =
∫∞
x fw,r(x, y)dy






P (W < R)
We derive the conditional second central moments as follows. First conditioned on the
event that trade takes place:
Eθ
[




R2i |Ri +Wi = 2p,Ri ≤ p
]




2fr,w(x, 2p− x)dx∫ p
−∞ fr,w(x, 2p− x)dx
− 2µr
∫ p
−∞ xfr,w(x, 2p− x)dx∫ p








W 2i |Ri +Wi = 2p,Wi ≥ p
]





p fr,w(2p− x, x)dx
− 2µw
∫∞
p xfr,w(2p− x, x)dx∫∞
p fr,w(2p− x, x)dx
+ µ2w
and conditioned on the event that no trade takes place:
Eθ
[




R2i |Wi < Ri
]





















W 2i |Wi < Ri
]













P (W < R)
+ µ2w
Finally:
Eθ [(Ri − µr)(Wi − µw)|Ri +Wi = 2pi, Ri ≤ pi]
=Eθ [RiWi|Ri +Wi = 2p,Ri ≤ p]− µwEθ [Ri|Ri +Wi = 2p,Ri ≤ p]
− µrEθ [Wi|Ri +Wi = 2p,Ri ≤ p] + µrµw
=
∫ p
−∞ x(2p− x)fr,w(x, 2p− x)dx∫ p
−∞ fr,w(x, 2p− x)dx
− µw
∫ p
−∞ xfr,w(x, 2p− x)dx∫ p
−∞ fr,w(x, 2p− x)dx
− µr
∫∞
p xfr,w(2p− x, x)dx∫∞
p fr,w(2p− x, x)dx
+ µrµw
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and
Eθ [(Ri − µr)(Wi − µw)|Wi < Ri]


















P (W < R)
+ µrµw
C.4 Model with Transaction Characteristics
Eθ [Ri|Ri +Wi = 2p,Ri ≤ p]
=Eθ
[
XTi βr + εi|XTi βr + εi + Y Ti βw + δi = 2p,XTi βr + εi ≤ p
]
=XTi βr + Eθ
[






where Z v N
(











(derivations are similar to single product
case) and
Eθ [Wi|Ri +Wi = 2p,Wi ≥ p]
=Eθ
[
Y Ti βw + δi|XTi βr + εi + Y Ti βw + δi = 2p, Y Ti βw + δi ≥ p
]
=Y Ti βw + Eθ
[
δi|εi + δi = 2p−XTi βr − Y Ti βw, δi ≥ p− Y Ti βw
]




1− Fz̃(p− Y Ti βw)
where Z̃ v N
(











Next, we derive the expectations conditioned on the event that no trade takes place:
Eθ [Ri|Wi < Ri] = Eθ
[
XTi βr + εi|Y Ti βw + δi < XTi βr + εi
]
= XTi βr + Eθ
[
εi|δi < εi +XTi βr − Y Ti βw
]






i βr − Y Ti βw)
P (δi − εi < XTi βr − Y Ti βw)
dx




i βr − Y Ti βw)dx
P (δi − εi < XTi βr − Y Ti βw)
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and
Eθ [Wi|Wi < Ri] = Eθ
[
Y Ti βw + δi|Y Ti βw + δi < XTi βr + εi
]
= Y Ti βw + Eθ
[
δi|εi > δi −XTi βr + Y Ti βw
]




fδ(x)[1− Fε(x−XTi βr + Y Ti βw)]
P (δi − εi < XTi βr − Y Ti βw)
dx




i βr + Y
T
i βw)]dx
P (δi − εi < XTi βr − Y Ti βw)
We derive the conditional second central moments as follows. First conditioned on the
event that trade takes place:
Eθ
[































1− Fz̃(p− Y Ti βw)
and -finally- conditioned on the event that no trade takes place:
Eθ
[















i βr − Y Ti βw)dx
P (δi − εi < XTi βr − Y Ti βw)
Eθ
[













2fδ(x)[1− Fε(x−XTi βr + Y Ti βw)]dx
P (δi − εi < XTi βr − Y Ti βw)
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4: ALGEBRAIC DERIVATIONS 137
C.5 Model with Transaction Characteristics and Correlated
Error Terms
Eθ [Ri|Ri +Wi = 2p,Ri ≤ p]
=XTi βr + Eθ
[






i βr − Y Ti βw − x)dx∫ p−XTi βr
−∞ fε,δ(x, 2p−X
T
i βr − Y Ti βw − x)dx
where fε,δ(x, y) is the joint pdf of (ε, δ). Similarly,
Eθ [Wi|Ri +Wi = 2p,Wi ≥ p] = Y Ti βw +
∫∞
p−Y Ti βw
xfε,δ(2p−XTi βr − Y Ti βw − x, x)dx∫∞
p−Y Ti βw
fε,δ(2p−XTi βr − Y Ti βw − x, x)dx
Next, we derive the expectations conditioned on the event that no trade takes place:
Eθ [Ri|Wi < Ri] = XTi βr + Eθ
[
εi|δi < εi +XTi βr − Y Ti βw
]
= XTi βr +
∫∞
−∞
∫ x+XTi βr−Y Ti βw
−∞ xfε,δ(x, y)dydx
P (δi − εi < XTi βr − Y Ti βw)
and




x−XTi βr+Y Ti βw
xfδ,ε(x, y)dydx
P (δi − εi < XTi βr − Y Ti βw)
We derive the conditional second central moments as follows. First conditioned on the
event that trade takes place:
Eθ
[









2fε,δ(x, 2p−XTi βr − Y Ti βw − x)dx∫ p−XTi βr
−∞ fε,δ(x, 2p−X
T









x2fε,δ(2p−XTi βr − Y Ti βw − x, x)dx∫∞
p−Y Ti βw
fε,δ(2p−XTi βr − Y Ti βw − x, x)dx
then conditioned on the event that no trade takes place:
Eθ
[









∫ x+XTi βr−Y Ti βw
−∞ x
2fε,δ(x, y)dydx
P (δi − εi < XTi βr − Y Ti βw)










x−XTi βr+Y Ti βw
x2fδ,ε(x, y)dydx














i βr − Y Ti βw − x)fε,δ(x, 2p−XTi βr − Y Ti βw − x)dx∫ p−XTi βr
−∞ fε,δ(x, 2p−X
T










x−XTi βr+Y Ti βw
xyfδ,ε(x, y)dydx
P (δi − εi < XTi βr − Y Ti βw)
